SOURCE INCOMPATIBILISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

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§1. Laying the Foundation: Three Recent Claims

Let "incompatibilism" refer to the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth of causal determinism.1 The following three claims about incompatibilism, while certainly not indisputable, are fairly prominent in the contemporary literature on moral responsibility. Call the first "the Taxonomy Claim."

Taxonomy Claim: There are two fundamentally different kinds of incompatibilism—Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism.2

Both Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism agree that the truth of causal determinism would be sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility. But according to the widely accepted taxonomy, these two species of incompatibilism differ in terms of what is required for moral responsibility. At the heart of Leeway Incompatibilism is the claim that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities, which would be ruled out by the truth of causal determinism. Likewise, at the heart of Source Incompatibilism is the claim that moral responsibility requires that an agent is the ultimate source of that action; and Source Incompatibilists think that the truth of causal determinism would imply that no one would be the ultimate source of her actions. Derk Pereboom, for example, expresses the Taxonomy claim this way:

We might call those incompatibilists who incline towards the view that an alternative possibilities condition has the more important role in explaining an agent’s moral responsibility leeway incompatibilists, and those who are predisposed to maintain that an incompatibilist condition on the causal history of the action plays the more significant part source incompatibilists.3

Or consider the following quotation from Randolph Clarke’s new book on libertarianism. According to Clarke, there is a group of writers who accept Frankfurt’s argument [but] nevertheless maintain that responsibility is incompatible with determinism. What is required for responsibility, some in this group hold, is that one’s actions not be determined by causal factors over which one has never had any control. This requirement may be satisfied in Frankfurt scenarios because the conditions that preclude the agent’s doing otherwise do not actually produce her action. But the requirement is violated if determinism is true. Hence, it is said, even though the ability to do otherwise is not required for responsibility, determinism is incompatible with responsibility. A nontraditional incompatibilist of this sort may note that an important core of free will is
retained in Frankfurt scenarios. . . . These agents actually determine, themselves, what they do; they are ultimate sources of their actions; they initiate or originate their behavior.

Many other, similar, versions of the Taxonomy Claim can be found in the literature; but these representative samples should be sufficient for present purposes.

Call the second claim of the triumvirate “the Refutation Claim.” The Refutation Claim is aimed at the first of the incompatibilist positions in the Taxonomy Claim.

**Refutation Claim:** Frankfurt-style counterexamples, or FSCs, show that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and thus that Leeway Incompatibilism is false.

Following Harry Frankfurt’s ingenious counterexample, many compatibilists reject the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (or PAP). If alternative possibilities are not essential for moral responsibility, the truth of causal determinism would not undermine moral responsibility in virtue of ruling out the ability to do otherwise. One can thus see the attraction Frankfurt’s argument would have for compatibilists. A number of prominent incompatibilists also share Frankfurt’s rejection of PAP. For example, the Refutation Claim can be found in Eleonore Stump’s “modified libertarianism.” According to Stump, rejection of an alternative possibilities condition for moral responsibility is compatible with incompatibilism:

It may be true that in most cases in which an agent acts with free will or is morally responsible, the agent can do otherwise. What Frankfurt-style counterexamples show is only that the ability to do otherwise isn’t essential to a free action or an action for which the agent is morally responsible. . . . Frankfurt-style counterexamples are successful against PAP; but, . . . the libertarian has nothing to fear from them.

Those incompatibilists who embrace the Refutation Claim don’t think, however, that Frankfurt-style examples threaten incompatibilism per se because of the dichotomy suggested by the Taxonomy Claim.

Finally, call the third claim of the set “the Inconsistency Claim.” Whereas the Refutation Claim addresses Leeway Incompatibilism, this third claim takes aim at Source Incompatibilism.

**Inconsistency Claim:** The kind of ultimacy or origination required by Source Incompatibilism is inconsistent with truths about the actual world.

Some have offered a stronger version of the Inconsistency Claim, which could be called the Impossibility Claim. The Impossibility Claim states that the kind of ultimacy or origination required by Source Incompatibilism is impossible. Perhaps best known in this regard is Galen Strawson’s “Basic Argument”:

1. Moral responsibility requires true self-determination (or being causa sui).
2. True self-determination (or being causa sui) is impossible.
3. Therefore, moral responsibility is impossible.

Similarly, in his recent book, Clarke writes that “there are, on balance, reasons to think that [the kind of] substance causation [required for ultimacy] is impossible.”9 However, focus on the weaker version of the Inconsistency Claim is sufficient for present purposes. Pereboom’s Living Without Free Will is an exemplar of the Inconsistency Claim. Pereboom explicitly rejects the Impossibility Claim, but embraces the weaker Inconsistency Claim:

No objections canvassed so far show that agent-causal libertarianism is incoherent, at least in the sense that it involves no detected logical
inconsistency. But this does not mean that it is in the clear. . . . The most significant empirical objections to agent-causal libertarianism challenge its capacity to accommodate our best natural scientific theories.\textsuperscript{10}

Reconciling the kind of ultimacy required for Source Incompatibilism with our current understanding of the physical world, Pereboom writes, “involves coincidences so wild as to make it incredible.”\textsuperscript{11}

If the Taxonomy Claim, the Refutation Claim, and the Inconsistency Claim are all true, then short of there being a hitherto unnoticed third variety of incompatibilism which holds neither alternatives possibilities nor ultimacy to be at the heart of the kind of control required for moral responsibility, moral responsibility exists only if compatibilism is true. (And if the Impossibility Claim is true, then moral responsibility cannot even possibly exist.) The present paper is concerned almost exclusively with the Taxonomy Claim, though the arguments here have implications for the Refutation Claim. The present paper therefore isn’t an argument for the truth of incompatibilism, but rather an argument for constraints on what form of incompatibilism should be embraced by those who think that the truth of determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility.

\textbf{§2. LEEEWAY INCOMPATIBILISM: REJECTING NAI\ICITY}

At the heart of Leeway Incompatibilism is an alternative possibilities condition, such as the aforementioned Principle of Alternative Possibilities (\textit{PAP}) that has been at the center of much of the discussion concerning moral responsibility in recent years:

\begin{equation*}
\textit{PAP} = \text{a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.}\textsuperscript{12}
\end{equation*}

The “could have done otherwise” clause here is most often understood as having access to alternative possibilities that are composable with the conjunction of the actual past and the laws of nature. While important, the focus on whether or not \textit{PAP} (or some similar principle) is true has in some ways misguided the debate over whether moral responsibility is compatible with the truth of causal determinism.

To see why this is, consider the following scenario. Imagine a possible world in which an agent is contemplating a morally significant decision: a university professor named Kelvin is contemplating whether to get out of bed on a Saturday morning and go jogging or stay in bed and watch \textit{CSI} reruns on TiVo. Let “\textit{t}” be the time of Kelvin’s decision; let “\textit{P}” refer to the proposition expressing the complete history of the universe prior to time \textit{t}. Let “\textit{L}” refer to the conjunction of all the laws of nature that are true in Kelvin’s universe. In the actual world, which contains both \textit{P} and \textit{L}, Kelvin carefully weighs his options and decides at \textit{t} to get out of bed and go jogging. Consider also another world, \textit{Beta}; \textit{Beta} shares \textit{P} and \textit{L} with the actual world; that is, both \textit{Beta} and the actual world have identical histories, and the same laws of nature are true in both worlds. In world \textit{Beta}, Kelvin (or his \textit{Beta}-counterpart) also weighs his options. At \textit{t}, the very moment where in the actual world Kelvin decides to go jogging, God smites Kelvin dead (let this be a lesson to slothful university professors). Furthermore, let us stipulate that \textit{Beta} and the actual world are the only two possible worlds composable with \textit{P} and \textit{L}. This then is what John Fischer calls a “Fischer scenario”: a scenario in which the agent dies in all of the alternative sequences open to him but one.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite being in a Fischer-scenario, alternative possibilities remain: Kelvin can either decide to go jogging or he can be killed. He thus has leeway with regard to his future. Insofar as the truth of determinism would mean that there are not multiple open futures, Leeway Incompatibilists think that having the alternative possibilities available to Kel-
vin would satisfy some minimal alternative possibilities condition, thereby satisfying a necessary condition for moral responsibility. But consider a particular strain of Leeway Incompatibilism, which might be called Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism. The Naïve Leeway Incompatibilist claims that it is solely in virtue of having such alternative possibilities, however miniscule or flimsy, that an agent satisfies the control condition for moral responsibility. On this view, having any kind of alternative possibilities would be sufficient for the kind of control needed for moral responsibility. To the best of my knowledge, no one actually endorses Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism in the literature, and for good reason. Even if Kelvin meets the other necessary conditions for moral responsibility, the alternative possibilities that he has in this case are not of the right sort to satisfy an adequate control condition for moral responsibility. It would be ludicrous to claim that Kelvin is morally praiseworthy for not giving in to laziness in virtue of having the following alternative possibility: God could have smote him at that very instant.

The problem with Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism is that it does not address the need for the agent involved to have control over which alternative possibility becomes actual in order to be morally responsible. Or to put the point a slightly different way, Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism is plagued by the “Chance” or “Luck” objection often raised against various forms of incompatibilism: the mere possibility of something else happening outside of the agent’s control would undermine, rather than bolster, the kind of control necessary for moral responsibility. As Fisher noted in an early paper on incompatibilist responses to Frankfurt-cases, “For the agent to have control, in the relevant sense, there must be an alternate sequence in which the agent does otherwise as a result of an appropriate sort of chain of events.” Or as Dan Speak puts the same point, one cannot “infer the relevance of alternative possibilities from the mere existence of such alternatives.”

So in order to avoid the obvious problem that besets Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism and show that the agent’s remaining alternative possibilities are relevant to her moral responsibility, the Leeway Incompatibilist needs to develop a way for the resolution of the leeway to be under the control of the agent in some appropriate way. Insofar as it is an incompatibilist theory, whatever it is about the agent in virtue of which she controls what alternative possibility becomes actual will have to be something that is not causally determined by anything outside of her. Most often, the language used at this point is that of the agent being the “source” of the action, or the action “originating” in the agent in some particularly way, or the outcome “ultimately” being up to the agent. This suggests that any acceptable incompatibilist view of moral responsibility, in order to avoid the problems with Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism, will have to appeal to some notion of “source” or “origination” or “ultimacy” as a necessary condition for moral responsibility, as an increasing number of current incompatibilist theories do. But to do that is to enter into the realm of Source Incompatibilism.

Before focusing on Source Incompatibilism, one final observation about Leeway Incompatibilism relevant to the Taxonomy Claim is worth making. As is apparent to anyone who is at all familiar with the literature on moral responsibility from the past three decades or so, the vast majority of it focuses on the need for alternative possibilities, the importance of being able to do otherwise, how to respond to Frankfurt-type scenarios, et cetera. In contrast, only a relatively small, but thankfully growing, percentage of the literature focuses primarily on the issues of “source,” “ultimacy” and “origination.” One might think that this suggests Leeway Incompatibilism has been around much longer than Source Incompatibilism. This
perception, it seems to me, could help explain the general widespread acceptance of the stark dichotomy expressed by the Taxonomy Claim. But as the above discussion of Naive Leeway Incompatibilism shows, no Leeway Incompatibilist ought to be content with mere alternative possibilities whose resolution is not somehow grounded in the agent. Incompatibilists should therefore be appreciative of the arguments of those compatibilists who have helped shift the focus off the mere presence of alternative possibilities toward a more metaphysically “robust” kind of agency.¹⁸

§3. SOURCE INCOMPATIBILISM: NARROW AND WIDE

Consider then Source Incompatibilism. The first development of an explicitly Source Incompatibilist position, in direct contrast with Leeway Incompatibilism, seems to be found, though not endorsed, in John Fischer’s 1982 “Responsibility and Control.”¹⁹ There, Fischer describes the position as “a radical departure from the conventional incompatibilist approach.”²⁰ According to Fischer, an incompatibilist can agree with “the kernel of truth in Frankfurt’s example . . . that responsibility attributions are based on what happens in the actual sequence”²¹ without having to agree with the compatibilist that agents can be morally responsible even if causal determinism is true. Fischer elaborates this as follows:

There are two ways in which it might be true that one couldn’t have done otherwise. In the first way, the actual sequence compels the agent to do what he does, so he couldn’t have initiated an alternate sequence; in the second way, there is no actual-sequence compulsion, but the alternate sequence would prevent the agent from doing other than he actually does. Frankfurt’s examples involve alternate-sequence compulsion; the incompatibilist about determinism and responsibility can agree with Frankfurt that in such cases an agent can be responsible even while lacking control [i.e., the ability to do otherwise], but he will insist that, since determinism involves actual-sequence compulsion, Frankfurt’s examples do not establish that responsibility is compatible with determinism.²²

Though he doesn’t use the term “Source Incompatibilism,” Fischer is describing a kind of incompatibilist view that is based, not on the need for alternative possibilities, but on some feature of the actual sequence. This feature of the actual sequence is a form of “ultimacy” or “origination,” as required on the Source Incompatibilist’s view.

Through a series of papers beginning in 2001, Michael McKenna has cemented the term “Source Incompatibilism” into the current taxonomy of positions. According to McKenna,

[t]he source incompatibilist agrees with Frankfurt as to the unimportance of alternative possibilities, but disagrees with those inclined to work towards compatibilist conclusions by building upon Frankfurt’s argument. Source incompatibilists hold that determinism does rule out free will. But it does so, not because it rules out alternative possibilities, but instead, because, if true, the sources of an agent’s actions do not originate in the agent but are traceable to factors outside her.²³

Again, one sees that a notion of “origination” or “ultimacy” is at the heart of Source Incompatibilism.

It will be helpful, however, to distinguish between two sub-categories of the Source Incompatibilist’s position. The reason for this is that some Source Incompatibilists insist on the truth of an alternative possibilities condition for moral responsibility. What makes them Source Incompatibilists, however, is that the ultimacy or source condition is more “fundamental” or “important” in some sense for moral responsibility. This is true of both Robert Kane’s²⁴ and Derek Pereboom’s²⁵ views. However, as indicated above, a number of incompatibilists think that an agent could be the required kind of source of her actions even if she has no alternative possibilities
whatevers. Eleonore Stump defends such a view, as do Linda Zagzebski and David Hunt. For example, Zagzebski argues that the incompatibilist “can reject PAP . . . because doing so has no effect on the deeper libertarian intuition.”²⁶ Similarly, she writes elsewhere that “the importance of Frankfurt’s examples is that they show us that the ability to do otherwise is beside the point. They get us to see that what makes Jones’s act free is not the presence or absence of alternative possibilities, but something else—the fact that he does it ‘on his own.’”²⁷ Thus, for these Source Incompatibilists, it is not the case that the ultimacy condition is simply “more fundamental” than the alternative possibilities condition; according to them, there is no required alternative possibilities condition for moral responsibility at all.

Let us then differentiate between “Narrow” and “Wide” versions of Source Incompatibilism.²⁸ Narrow Source Incompatibilists will be those who think that an agent’s being morally responsible for some action A is a matter of the agent’s being the proper source of A, and that being the proper kind of source doesn’t require alternative possibilities at all. The term “narrow” here is intended to capture the idea that, on this view, alternative possibilities are outside of the scope of what is required for moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who embrace the Refutation Claim and reject all PAP-like principles are thus Narrow Source Incompatibilists. Wide Source Incompatibilists, on the other hand, take a broader and more inclusive approach to moral responsibility. These incompatibilists insist that what is most fundamental to moral responsibility is ultimacy or origination, but still maintain that there is some PAP-like alternative possibilities condition that is also true, and that in virtue of it alternative possibilities of some sort are still required for moral responsibility. Exactly how these alternative possibilities are related to moral responsibility according to Wide Source Incompatibilism is a complex issue for numerous reasons, not least of which is the debate surrounding the “Robustness Requirement.” While there are a couple of different formulations of the Robustness Requirement in the literature, the basic idea is that in order for the alternative possibilities that to be relevant to the agent’s moral responsibility, they must be metaphysically robust in some sense; that is, they must not suffer what Fischer calls “a deficiency of oomph.”²⁹ While the debates surrounding the Robustness Requirement are important, for present purposes let us set them aside as much as possible and instead focus on the relative strengths of Narrow and Wide Source Incompatibilism.

§4. Ultimacy and Alternative Possibilities

There are two ways one could proceed at this point in the argument: a negative route and a positive route. The negative route would involve arguing against Narrow Source Incompatibilism, and thus showing the relevant preference that should be given to its Wide sibling. A preliminary version of argument has been offered elsewhere.³⁰ However, in order to fully support Wide Source Incompatibilism over Narrow Source Incompatibilism, one would also need to argue against blockage cases. While there is good reason to think that blockage cases fail insofar as they presuppose the truth of causal determinism, such a claim cannot be argued for here.³¹ The present paper will instead pursue the positive route, which involves arguing that the most compelling forms of Source Incompatibilism will be of the Wide variety because the most plausible understanding of the ultimacy condition will involve alternative possibilities of some sort.

In a recent paper devoted to the control condition for moral responsibility, Tim O’Connor contrasts two components of freedom—the alternative possibilities condition
and the ultimacy condition—which underlie the distinction between Leeway and Source Incompatibilism respectively. What reflection on Frankfurt-type cases shows, O’Connor argues, is not that the alternative possibilities condition is false, as the Refutation Claim proposes. Rather, O’Connor thinks that the lesson to be learned from Frankfurt-type cases is only the weaker conclusion that freedom or control “is not to be identified with the existence of . . . alternatives,”32 whether robust or not. In order for whatever alternative possibilities there are to be relevant to the agent’s moral responsibility, they must be what O’Connor describes as “an outgrowth of a certain quality of the act itself.”33 A similar point was already noted earlier in the rejection of Naïve Leeway Incompatibilism: in order for alternatives to be relevant to an agent’s moral responsibility, the resolution of the indeterminacy involved in the act must be under the control of the agent herself. So again one sees that “ultimacy” or “origination,” or what O’Connor calls “self-determination,” is of fundamental importance to moral responsibility.

Nevertheless, the remaining alternative possibilities can serve as a necessary condition for the agent being the ultimate source of her action. O’Connor makes this point as follows: “the significance of such alternatives (whether they are robust or mere “buds”) lies in their being indicators of the self-determination manifested by one’s actions, which is necessary for responsibility.”34 As already seen, the mere presence of alternatives will not be sufficient for self-determination. This is, after all, one of the lessons of the Chance Objection to incompatibilism. But even if alternative possibilities are not always indicative of self-determination, they are a necessary precondition for it insofar as they mean that the action in question is not causally determined. As noted earlier by Michael Della Rocca, the incompatibilist can claim that an alternative possibility is explanatorily relevant to moral responsibility even if it isn’t a robust alternative. From the presence of even a weak or non-robust alternative, “we can conclude . . . that the action was not determined by external factors.”35 In other words, the presence of any alternative possibilities is a sufficient condition for the falsity of causal determinism, which according to incompatibilists of all stripes is itself a necessary condition for moral responsibility. More particularly, proponents of both versions of Source Incompatibilism think that the falsity of causal determinism makes possible the fulfillment of the ultimacy condition for moral responsibility. The Source Incompatibilist isn’t thereby claiming that the presence of alternative possibilities is some magical element that, when present, magically transforms a case of non-responsibility into a case of moral responsibility.36 There is no “problem of alchemy,”37 as Fischer puts, for the Source Incompatibilist isn’t claiming that the alternative possibilities somehow, by their mere presence, ground moral responsibility or make a case of non-responsibility into a case of responsibility. Rather, they merely serve as a necessary, though not themselves sufficient, condition of what does ground moral responsibility, namely ultimacy.

The Wide Source Incompatibilist agrees with her Narrowly-inclined cousin that what plays the fundamental role in moral responsibility is ultimacy. The Wide Source Incompatibilist may even concede that the alternative possibilities condition for moral responsibility traditionally insisted on offers no independent theoretical justification or explanation of an agent’s moral responsibility. If this is true, then the remaining alternative possibilities are not what justify or explain or ground the fittingness of the reactive attitudes. So it may be the case that the remaining alternatives are even irrelevant per se to moral responsibility, and that it is the ultimacy condition, whatever its exact formulation, that is doing all the justificatory work.
But here is where the two versions of Source Incompatibilism part ways. Unlike the Narrow Source Incompatibilist, the Wide Source Incompatibilist claims that the satisfaction of the ultimacy condition entails that the agent has alternative possibilities and thus also satisfies an alternative possibilities condition. In order for the ultimacy condition to be met, the agent must not be causally determined by anything outside of herself. The agent herself will be the difference-maker for whether the action for which she is morally responsible happens or not. But if the agent is to be the difference-maker, then there must be more than one possible future that is open to her at the time of her action. To see why this is, consider Laura Ekstrom’s specification of the ultimacy condition:

In my view, moral responsibility requires indeterminism. . . . A free act is one done deliberately from a preference of the agent’s such that the preference was not coercively imposed and such that it was not causally determined by previous events that the agent would have precisely that motivation for action. Moral responsibility requires indeterminism in the construction of the self, such that the reasons for acting and desiring that one adopts as one’s own are independently acquired, not acquired of necessity in a way that is fully explicable by reference to the laws of nature and events in one’s past.38

By saying that moral responsibility requires that an agent is not causally determined to act as she does “at each moment,” Ekstrom is rightly leaving open the possibility that if an agent imposes deterministic constraints on herself, rather than those constraints being simply the inevitable interplay of the distant past and the laws of nature, the agent could still be the ultimate source for her actions. In other words, ultimacy does allow for what is often referred to as “derivative responsibility” or a “tracing condition” on moral responsibility.39 (Exactly how the tracing condition should be specified is an issue best left for another time.) But self-imposed forms of determinism are distinct from the stronger thesis of causal determinism, and it is the latter that the Source Incompatibilist thinks is incompatible with moral responsibility.

If nothing about the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature determines the way in which the agent originates her action, or if the only relevant features about the past are ones that are themselves determined by the agent herself, then if the agent is to be morally responsible for some feature of the future, she will be the difference-maker to the way that the future unfolds. But in order for this to be the case, there must be more than one future that is compossible with the conjunction of the past (or those parts of the past that were not themselves determined by the agent) and the laws of nature. If this is right, then the Source Incompatibilist’s emphasis on the ultimacy condition will entail that the agent does have alternative possibilities available to her, even if the explanatory weight of those alternative possibilities does not extend beyond merely securing the falsity of causal determinism. It is for this reason that the earlier debates about the Robustness Requirement are beside the issue here. For even if the remaining alternative possibilities do not satisfy whatever the Robust Requirement ends up being, their presence—again, at some point or other to accommodate the possibility of tracing—is necessary (and sufficient) for the falsity of determinism. These alternative possibilities are not just a concomitant of the required ultimacy, but a necessary concomitant. Thus, their absence is sufficient for the agent’s not satisfying the ultimacy condition for moral responsibility.

As mentioned above, the Wide Source Incompatibilist thinks that the presence of any alternative possibilities shows us something about the actual sequence, namely that it is indeterministic. So Wide Source Incompatibilism is still an actual sequence approach to moral responsibility, despite the fact that
it appeals to an alternative possibilities condition.\textsuperscript{40} Consider again the case of Kelvin, the lazy university professor unfortunately trapped in a Fischer-scenario. Recall that in the only alternative available sequence, Kelvin is smitten by God. But let me here revise the case as described earlier, and stipulate here that in the actual sequence, and only in the actual sequence, Kelvin satisfies the ultimacy condition for moral responsibility. So whether Kelvin is morally responsible (as in the present case) or not (as in the case as originally described) depends primarily on features of the actual sequence. But which of the two sequences becomes actual is a function of what Kelvin does: God will smite him dead if and only if he doesn’t decide to go jogging. So Kelvin is still the difference-maker with respect to whether or not he is morally responsible.

Regarding the connection between the alternative possibilities and ultimacy conditions for moral responsibility,\textsuperscript{41} Robert Kane thinks that if an agent satisfies the ultimacy condition, this entails that the agent could have done otherwise voluntarily, intentionally, and rationally.\textsuperscript{42} In other words, Kane thinks that the alternative possibilities condition that is entailed by the ultimacy condition is one in which the remaining alternatives involve the agent’s acting voluntarily. Perhaps this condition could be approximated as follows:

\[ PAP_x = \text{df an agent is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise voluntarily, intentionally and rationally.} \]

Along similar lines, while Fischer thinks that there is not an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility, he seems to think that any acceptable alternative possibilities condition (if there were one) would be along the lines of \( PAP_x \). In his contribution to The Oxford Handbook on Free Will, Fischer writes “if one believes that one’s moral responsibility is grounded in the sort of control that involves genuine alternative possibilities, it seems to me that those alternative possibilities must contain voluntary behavior.”\textsuperscript{43} But if Wide Source Incompatibilism as described here is true, then there is no reason to think that the remaining alternatives must contain voluntary behavior, as Kane and Fischer think should be required. Indeed, the revised version of the Kelvin story gives us reason to think that the remaining alternatives \textit{needn’t} contain voluntary behavior. What matters for moral responsibility is what happens in the actual sequence, namely whether or not the agent satisfies the ultimacy condition for moral responsibility (and whatever other necessary conditions for moral responsibility there are) in that sequence. Nevertheless, an agent who satisfies the ultimacy condition will have some alternative possibilities, even if he is in a Fischer-scenario and the only other sequences available to him do not contain voluntary behavior. Wide Source Incompatibilism does not claim that an agent is morally responsible for an action \textit{because} he has these flimsy or non-robust alternative possibilities open to him. After all, not all alternative possibilities are morally significant. What is doing the explanatory work for the agent’s moral responsibility, so to speak, is not the alternative possibilities, but rather the agent’s satisfying the ultimacy condition. But if an agent satisfies the ultimacy condition with respect to a particular action, then she will also satisfy an alternative possibilities condition with regard to that action, though it may admittedly be a weak alternative possibilities condition.

\section{Conclusion}

Insofar as the heart of the Source Incompatibilist’s position is some sort of ultimacy condition, she must also embrace an alternative possibilities condition.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, while incompatibilism perhaps does not require Frankfurt’s principle of alternative possibilities, it does require \textit{an} alternative possi-
sibilities condition since that is entailed by the ultimacy condition that underlies moral responsibility. In other words, Wide Source Incompatibilism is preferable to either Narrow Source Incompatibilism or Leeway Incompatibilism. However if Wide Source Incompatibilism is, as here argued, the most plausible approach to incompatibilism, then the commonly accepted distinction between Source Incompatibilism and Leeway Incompatibilism—that is, the Taxonomy Claim with which this paper began—should be rejected because ultimacy and alternative possibilities are intrinsically related. Furthermore, since the incompatibilist will insist that the falsity of causal determinism is itself morally relevant, the remaining alternatives that are sufficient for the falsity of causal determinism will themselves be morally relevant, even if it is only in this derivative way.  

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NOTES

1. Let “causal determinism,” or simply “determinism” for short, be the thesis that the future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the non-relational past and the laws of nature.

2. Source incompatibilism is sometimes also referred to as “actual-sequence incompatibilism,” “causal history incompatibilism” or “hyper-incompatibilism.” See, for example, Fischer 1994: p. 180; Fischer 1999: p. 93; and Fischer 2006: p. 7. Elsewhere, I have used the term “Frankfurt Incompatibilism” to refer to the form of incompatibilism which rejects an alternative possibilities condition for moral responsibility; see Timpe 2006b, particularly footnote 7; and Timpe 2006a. This is the view referred to as “Narrow Source Incompatibilism” below.


4. Clarke 2003: p. 11. Though this is a contentious issue, for purposes of the present paper, understand “free will” to be the kind of control required for moral responsibility.

5. The Taxonomy Claim can also be found in Kane 1989; Fischer 2000: p. 324; and McKenna 2003: pp. 202–203. See also the editors’ introduction to Campbell, O’Rourke, and Shier 2004: p. 8.

6. The historical focal point for the Refutation Claim is, of course, Frankfurt 1969. The truth of the Refutation Claim would also mean that Wide Source Incompatibilism, defined below, is false.


8. This way of formulating the Basic Argument is compiled from a number of different formulations that Strawson gives in Strawson 1994.

9. Clarke 2003: p. 221. Here Clark is specifically addressing what he calls “broad incompatibilism,” which is the view that both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. See also Smilansky 1997. In a recent article, Mark Balaguier goes so far as to say that “many (probably most) philosophers think that libertarianism is incoherent” (Balaguier 2004: p. 379).


11. Ibid., p. 85. Similarly, Martha Klein writes that the conditions for incompatibilist free action “cannot be empirically fulfilled” (Klein 1990: p. 4).

12. Frankfurt 1969: p. 829. In the subsequent literature, many PAP-like principles have been formulated, defended and attacked. In the present paper, the relative strengths and weaknesses of these various principles will not be considered, instead focusing on the more general issue of whether any alternative possibilities condition must be met in order for an agent to be morally responsible.
13. Fischer 2002: p. 288. The scenario above is also inspired by similar cases presented in McKenna 2003.

14. There are, of course, a number of compatibilists who think that the truth of causal determinism would not preclude alternative possibilities; but such issues need not concern us here.

15. Also related at this point is what Robert Kane calls “the Libertarian Dilemma” (Kane 2005: pp. 33–34).


17. Speak 1999: p. 239. See also Della Rocca 1998.

18. For similar criticism of the near “exclusive preoccupation with the alternative-possibilities condition,” see O’Connor 2005: p. 211.

19. The first use of the term “Source Incompatibilism” to name this position, however, appears to be in McKenna 2001.


21. Ibid., p. 33.

22. Ibid., pp. 33–34.


28. Thanks to Bob Kane for suggesting these terms.


31. See, however, the discussion in Pereboom 2001: p. 18; and in Kane 2003. The most elaborate, and in my mind convincing, criticism of such cases is found in Goetz 2005. Many of Goetz’s conclusions there complement those of the present article.


33. Ibid., p. 209.


35. Della Rocca 1998: p. 102. Consider also the following: “[the incompatibilist] can get significant mileage out of some flickers of freedom, given the indeterminism that those flickers require” (Mele 1998: p. 154) and “The truth of determinism is sufficient for the lack of alternative possibilities, and the lack of alternative possibilities is sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility. Hence, the truth of determinism is sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility” (Goetz 2002: p. 143, fn. 9).

36. See, for example, Fischer 1994: p. 141.


39. The idea here is that an agent can be morally responsible for an unavoidable action if the reason why that action is unavoidable is something the agent is herself responsible for; the agent’s moral re-
sponsibility can be “traced” back to the prior action that made the later action unavoidable. Such tracing would require either the falsity of determinism or individuals to have infinite histories as agents. Given that agents don’t have infinite histories, the only way for them to satisfy the ultimacy condition would be for them to be responsible for voluntary actions that are undetermined. For an excellent paper that raises serious challenges for the role that tracing plays here, see Vargas 2005.

40. It is perhaps not a purely actual sequence view insofar as the agent meeting the ultimacy condition in the actual sequence requires alternatives of a certain sort. But like Fischer’s own view, which he describes as an actual sequence view, the principal claim is about the nature of the actual sequence.

41. While Kane is talking primarily about free will, it is clear from the context that he is concerned with the kind of free will required for moral responsibility.

42. See, for instance, Kane 2004: pp. 72–73.

43. Fischer 2002: pp. 287–288. See also pp. 301–302: “Of course, I do not accept the alternative-possibilities control model of moral responsibility. But my contention is that, if you buy into this traditional picture, then you should also acknowledge that the alternative possibilities must be of a certain sort—they must be sufficiently robust,” where the discussion makes it clear that Fischer thinks that only alternative possibilities containing voluntary actions would be sufficiently robust.

44. Again, these comments are intended to apply only to incompatibilist accounts of ultimacy. There are compatibilist accounts of ultimacy. In a future monograph, Free Will: Ultimacy and Its Alternatives, I hope to show why these accounts are problematic.

45. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2006 Pacific APA and the 2006 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, where I received valuable comments and criticisms from my commentators: Michael McKenna, Seth Shabo, and Kip Werking. Thanks also to Todd Long, Scott Ragland, Neal Tognazzini, Matt Zwolinski, and two anonymous referees for APQ for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. Finally, I am greatly indebted to John Fischer, Joe Campbell, Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, and especially Michael McKenna for helpful conversations regarding these, and related, issues.

REFERENCES


