Virtues and Their Vices

EDITED BY
KEVIN TIMPE AND CRAIG A. BOYD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
To the philosophy department at Saint Louis University—which instantiates many of the qualities that make a community flourish, and by whom we have been shaped. In particular, we’d like to thank Fr Ted Vitali for his godfather-like leadership, Eleonore Stump for being an exemplar of a devoted scholar, and Jack Doyle for his meticulous ability to master the text.
Acknowledgments

As with any project this size, we have benefitted greatly from the hard work and expertise of numerous people. The idea for this volume came from one of us (Kevin Timpe) teaching a course entitled ‘Virtues and Vices’ at the University of San Diego. It has taken numerous years to come to completion, and was delayed by the unfortunate death of an original contributor, for whom we had to secure a replacement. We’d like to express our gratitude to the staff at Oxford University Press—especially Tom Perridge, Lizzie Robottom, and Cathryn Steele—for their never-failing support, encouragement, and patience. Nathan Maddix and Audra Jenson provided valuable editorial assistance in preparing the final volume. Earlier versions of some of the material in this volume helped form the body of a 2012 summer seminar that Timpe co-directed with Christina Van Dyke at Calvin College. We’d also like to express our gratitude to our universities, Saint Louis University and Northwest Nazarene University, for their support of our research.
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Introduction

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RESURGENCE OF THE VIRTUES

The recent revival of philosophical work devoted to virtue ethics, and virtue theory more generally, is well documented. Though there is always something rather artificial to drawing temporal and intellectual boundaries of this sort, this resurgence can perhaps be seen as beginning in 1958 with G. E. M. Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy.’\(^1\) In her article, Anscombe criticizes the dominant deontological and consequentialist approaches to the ethics of her day. One key problem, Anscombe claims, is that they wrongly focus on legalistic notions of obligations and rules. The language these theories employ appeals to an outdated moral context—a context that assumed a divine law-giver as the one who established the order of the world or at least a context that assumed a fairly stable human nature. She suggests that ethics would benefit from an adequate moral psychology, such as that found in ancient Greek ethics where one can ‘look for “norms” in human virtues’:

\[\text{[J]ust as man has so many teeth, which is certainly not the average number of teeth men have, but is the number of teeth for the species, so perhaps the species man, regarded not just biologically, but from the point of view of the activity of thought and choice in regard to the various departments of life—powers and faculties and use of things needed—“has” such-and-such virtues: and this “man” with the complete set of virtues is the “norm”, as “man” with, e.g., a complete set of teeth is a norm. But in this sense “norm” has ceased to be roughly equivalent to “law”.}\(^2\)

\(^1\) Anscombe (1958). Speaking of the impact of Anscombe’s article on contemporary philosophical reflection on the virtues, Crisp and Slote write that ‘Anscombe’s article anticipates much of the recent development of virtue ethics in large part through having influenced that development. But many present-day ethicists—including both defenders and opponents of virtue ethics—would question some of Anscombe’s main assumptions in “Modern Moral Philosophy.”’ (Crisp and Slote (1997), 4).

\(^2\) Anscombe (1958), 14f.
According to Anscombe, only a return to a virtue approach to ethics and the notions of human flourishing and well-being that underscore such an approach will be able to provide for the future flourishing of ethics.3

Anscombe’s article didn’t initially receive much attention. However, in the coming decades her critique of modern ethics would be continued, among other places, in the work of Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre. Foot begins her article ‘Virtues and Vices’ with a criticism of the modern ethical landscape that is reminiscent of Anscombe:

For many years the subject of the virtues and vices was strangely neglected by moralists working within the school of analytic philosophy. The tacitly accepted opinion was that study of the topic would form no part of the fundamental work of ethics. . . . During the past few decades several philosophers have turned their attention to the subject.4

Foot then goes on to express the linguistic difficulty that such a rapprochement would face, which she describes as

a lack of coincidence between their terminology and our own. For when we talk about the virtues we are not taking as our subject everything to which Aristotle gave the name aretē or Aquinas virtus, and consequently not everything called a virtue in translations of these authors. The virtues’ to us are the moral virtues whereas aretē and virtus refer also to arts, and even to excellences of the speculative intellect whose domain is theory rather than practice.5

As shall become clear below, this volume’s approach to the virtues is broad, including not only the moral virtues but also (following Aristotle, among others) intellectual virtues and (following Aquinas, among others) theological virtues.

MacIntyre’s influential book After Virtue examines the historical roots of thinking about virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence from the majority of contemporary moral theorizing, and offers a proposal for its recovery. In this work, he asks his audience to

Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools

3 A number of the main critiques Anscombe gives in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ were anticipated in Schopenhauer (1841). Robert Adams notes that it is a ‘curious feature of Anscombe’s paper that at the substantive, as distinct from the metaethical level, she seems much more concerned with the ethics of actions than the ethics of traits of character. Concepts of virtue are to provide the terminology of moral assessment, but it is actions that she seems-absorbingly interested in identifying as “untruthful,” “unchaste,” or “unjust” (Adams 2006, 5). He also raises a similar criticism regarding MacIntyre’s After Virtue, which we discuss below.

4 Foot (1997), 163.

5 Foot (1997), 164.
and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still, there is a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all they possess are fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them significance.\footnote{MacIntyre (1981), 3.}

This dystopia is a world in which scientific terms have been radically altered from their original context even though they appear to function in a scientific way. People think that they are engaged in the practices of the sciences. But since they have no coherent method to form their practices what they do is more closely related to alchemy rather than genuine science. In a similar way, the language of ethics, devoid of a coherent narrative of its practices as grounded in moral psychology and the virtues, devolves into a series of incommensurable language games. But MacIntyre was not advocating a return to the virtue ethics of a previous era, for both the concepts of narrative unity and practice have been lost.\footnote{MacIntyre (1981), 226.} Those ‘practices’ are what primarily constitute specific virtues.

In subsequent years, much of what Anscombe and Foot advocated for has come to pass, and virtue theory has seen a resurgence. But this trend has also been shaped by MacIntyre’s vision regarding the loss of narrative unity. Our aim in this work is both to document this trend and to contribute to it. Merely parroting the work of Aristotle, Aquinas, or some other historically important figure in virtue ethics does not advance research. In this volume, like MacIntyre we aim not to be slavishly beholden to the past. However, unlike some recent books on virtue (you will hopefully forgive us if we fail to name names), it is equally problematic to write on the virtues as if they have no historical context. The treatment of the virtues in the subsequent chapters aims to be sensitive to the historical heritage of the virtues, including their theological heritage, without being beholden to this tradition. In what follows, we intentionally engage contemporary philosophical scholarship as well as relevant scholarship from related disciplines.

**Contemporary Reflection on the Virtues**

Largely as a result of the above developments, contemporary work on virtue and virtue ethics more broadly is flourishing. It is, as David Solomon recently put it, ‘an embarrassment of riches.’\footnote{D. Solomon (2003), 58.} But it would be wrong to describe contemporary philosophical reflection on the virtues as monolithic. It’s simply not the case that there is a single, unified account of virtue theory, or even the nature of the virtues themselves. Although there is a strong tradition of
reflection on the virtues running from Plato and Aristotle through Augustine and Aquinas down to contemporary thinkers such as Anscombe, Foot, and MacIntyre, even within this tradition there is an on-going conversation about the exact content and extent of that account. Furthermore, philosophical reflection on the virtues isn’t restricted to this tradition. Christian Miller notes this breadth in his recent *The Philosophy and Psychology of Moral Character*:

Virtue ethical positions take the virtues to be among the central ethical concepts and typically use them to ground an account of morally right actions. But even consequentialists, Kantians, moral pluralists, and advocates of other competing views have realized the importance that the virtues should play in their overall normative ethical theories, even if it is not at the foundational or grounding level.9

Nancy Sherman’s *Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue*, for instance, explores Kant’s ethical writings on the virtues, with an eye towards how his thought depends on ancient philosophy, including Aristotle but most notable the Stoics. As she notes there, ‘Kant was self-aware of his historical predecessors and in sympathy with important parts of the ancient tradition of virtue. His own distinctive contributions cannot be underestimated, but by his own telling, the account of virtues [he develops] owes clear debts to “the ancient moral philosophers, who pretty well exhausted all that can be said upon virtue”’.10 Other voices contributing to reflection on the virtues include John Stuart Mill and select other consequentialists,11 Humeans and other sentimentalists,12 and even iconoclasts such as Nietzsche.13 All of these voices—to some extent—represent the language of virtue.

According to David Solomon, even within virtue ethics there are ‘disagreements that are as deep, and sometimes as divisive, as those that arise across normative theories.’14 For example, many virtue ethicists seek to follow Aristotle quite closely, while Rosalind Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics* is a neo-Aristotelian approach and Julia Annas’ *The Morality of Happiness* draws more on the Stoics. Solomon outlines two divergent ways one might pursue virtue ethics, which he characterizes as ‘routine’ and ‘radical’.15 Routine virtue ethics sees the revival of virtue in contemporary ethics as being fairly continuous with much of nineteenth and twentieth century analytic ethics. It emphasizes ‘the virtues while working comfortably within the conventions of contemporary

9 Miller (2013), 23.  
12 See, for instance, Dees (1997) and Taylor (2002).  
14 D. Solomon (2003), 58.  
15 Hookway suggests that a similar difference between the routine and the radical can be found in virtue epistemology as well; see Hookway (2003), 185.
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ethical theory.\textsuperscript{16} In contrast, radical virtue ethics involves a much greater break with most of nineteenth and twentieth century analytic ethics. ‘Here the question is not how to locate the concept of virtue within the local economy of practical life, but rather how to accommodate certain fundamental commitments of classical ethical theory within the relatively restricted—and restricting—agenda of modern moral philosophy.\ldots\textsuperscript{[On this second approach] there is a much grander conflict between the ambitions and agenda of modern ethics—and its classical opponents.}\textsuperscript{17} What marks an approach to virtue as routine, according to Solomon, is that it ‘attempt[s] to reduce the difference between an ethics of virtue and its contemporary alternatives to a single, crucial issue—the place of the notion of virtue in the overall justificatory structure of a theory’.\textsuperscript{18} As examples of such approaches, he mentions those modern neo-Kantian and consequentialist theories—some of which were mentioned above—which attempt to accommodate the virtues within a preexisting normative system. On such approaches, ‘virtue has been invited into the house of contemporary normative theory, but told to stay in its place—typically some subordinate or secondary place within the overall structure of the theory.’\textsuperscript{19} Despite this contrast, Solomon also points out that one can conceive of a spectrum of approaches to virtue ethics, some of which are more routine or radical than others, and some of which may be intermediate between the two.

The essays that follow illustrate the multiplicity of approaches to virtue mentioned above. Short of imposing a single tradition on all the essays (which, we think, would lead to a narrower and less interesting work), we do not see a way of eliminating this diversity from the volume. As a result, the essays that follow contain a range of considerations and assumptions about the best way to approach the virtues. Despite this breadth, however, the main thrust of the majority of the essays is best understood as working within the general tradition beginning with Aristotle, continuing through Aquinas and any number of other medieval philosophers and theologians, and represented in contemporary philosophy by Anscombe, Foot, MacIntyre, and Solomon, among others. We want it to be clear that in this volume we neither develop nor presuppose a particular account of virtue ethics. A crucial reason for this is that the present volume focuses more on particular virtues than virtue theory in general. But even here, it is not our aim to develop a theory of the nature of

\textsuperscript{16} D. Solomon (2003), 66. For this reason, Solomon is willing to include ‘routine virtue ethics’ to include those deontologists and consequentialists who seek to find a place for virtue within their own theories. At other times in this article, however, Solomon seems to exclude this approach from the umbrella of ‘routine’ approaches, instead seeing it as a third approach altogether.

\textsuperscript{17} D. Solomon (2003), 76–7.

\textsuperscript{18} D. Solomon (2003), 69.

\textsuperscript{19} D. Solomon (2003), 70. In addition to using the language of such approaches ‘subordinating’ virtue to their normative frameworks, he also describes these views as ‘condescending to the virtues.’
Instead, our primary aim in this collection has been to bring together treatments of particular virtues and, in many cases, the primary vices opposed to them.

The Nature of the Virtues

As mentioned above, it is not the case that all work on the virtues and vices reflects a single account of what they are. Aristotle’s discussion of moral character, and virtue in particular, is the historically most influential treatment of such issues. For this reason, his discussion will be used as a beginning point.

The Greek word used by Aristotle and most commonly translated as virtue is *aretē*, which is perhaps better translated as ‘goodness’ or ‘excellence’. In general, an excellence is a quality that makes an individual a good member of its kind. For example, it is an excellence of an axe if it is able to cut wood efficiently and effectively. An excellence, therefore, is a property whereby its possessor operates well or fulfills its function. Aristotle, for instance, sometimes speaks of a good moral character as ‘human excellence’ or an ‘excellence of soul’ (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.13). The idea here is the same as with the axe—having a good moral character helps its possessor operate well and live up to her potential, thereby fulfilling her nature.

Those approaches to the virtues that are heavily indebted to Aristotle’s conception have been referred to as ‘the Traditional View of Moral Character,’ or the *Traditional View* for short. Different theories within the Traditional View will, of course, fill out the details in diverse ways. So it will be helpful to think of the ‘Traditional View as a family of similar and related views, rather than a fully developed and determinate view itself. Despite this variation, the Traditional View holds that virtues are relatively stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions of action and affect that ought to be rationally informed. Since virtues are relatively stable and reliable dispositions, they should be reasonably good predictors over time of an agent’s behavior if that agent is in a trait-relevant situation. This does not mean, however, that such traits must be exceptionless. For example, a single case of dishonesty need not mean that an individual lacks a generally honest character. Thus, the dispositions should be understood as involving a particular level of probability. Furthermore, while such traits are malleable—individuals can change their moral character over time—such changes are usually not immediate, taking both time and effort.

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20 For two recent worthwhile attempts to construct a theory of virtue, see Annas (2011) and Adams (2006). More on their views in ‘The Nature of the Virtues.’

21 The term ‘*aretic*’ ethics has become more popular recently because it is a translation from the Greek for ‘excellence.’ The English word ‘virtue’ comes from the Latin ‘*vir*’ and means ‘manly.’ Some object to this on the grounds of a kind of linguistic gender exclusion.

Moral character traits are not just dispositions to engage in certain outward behaviors; they can also be dispositions to have certain emotions or affections. For example, justice is often understood as the disposition to treat others as they are due, while courage is the disposition to feel the appropriate amount of fear called for by a situation. But in both cases one should feel the appropriate kind of emotion (e.g. fear or anger) to the appropriate degree. Additionally, insofar as they are dispositions, an individual can have a particular virtue and not currently be manifesting trait-relevant behavior or affect. An individual may be generous in her giving to charity, even if she is not engaged presently in any charitable action. Finally, in order for a moral character trait to be a virtue, it must not only be in accord with the relevant moral norms, but the disposition must also be informed by proper reasoning about the matter at hand. This is so because the virtues are excellences of character insofar as they are the best exercise of reason. This connection between practical reasoning and the other virtues is one that comes up repeatedly in the pages that follow.

Proponents of the Traditional View also tend to endorse three further claims about the virtues: the Robustness Claim, the Stability Claim, and the Interconnection Claim. The first two are claims about the nature of the virtues, while the third is a claim about the relationship among the virtues within a particular individual. According to the Robustness Claim, an individual with a particular virtue will exhibit trait-relevant behavior across a broad spectrum of trait-relevant situations. It is for this reason that virtues are said to be ‘robust’ traits. Given that the virtues, as mentioned above, need not be exceptionless, a single counter-instance doesn’t rule out an individual’s possession of a particular trait and doesn’t contradict the Robustness Claim. According to the Stability Claim, moral character traits are relatively stable over time. The Stability Claim doesn’t preclude the possibility of an individual changing his moral character over time. Rather, it holds that such changes take time. A soldier who has courageously proven himself in battle situations over the course of numerous years will not cease to be courageous overnight. If the soldier does act non-courageously in a particular battle, the Stability Claim suggests that we should still think of the soldier as possessing the virtue of courage unless the soldier behaves non-courageously for a significant period of time. Finally, according to the Interconnection Claim there is a probabilistic correlation between having one virtue and having other virtues. We explore this aspect of the Traditional View in greater detail in the next section.

Even within those who endorse a version of the Traditional View, there are often important differences between exactly how the virtues are understood. As evidence of this variety, consider what we think are two of the leading

23 All three of these claims find support in Gordon Allport’s work on the ‘psychology of virtue.’ See, for instance, Allport (1960).
accounts of virtue, those developed and defended by Julia Annas and Robert Adams. A virtue, for Annas, is an active, developing, persisting, and reliable disposition to act, feel, or respond in certain ways. These dispositions are ‘deep’ and ‘characteristic’ features of the person—that is, the virtuous (or vicious) person is acting in and from character. . . . A virtue is a disposition which is central to the person, to whom he or she is, a way we standardly think of character.\textsuperscript{24} According to Annas, what is distinctive about her account of virtue are two ideas:

One is that exercising a virtue involves practical reasoning of a kind that can illuminatingly be compared to the kind of reasoning we find in someone exercising a practical skill. . . . The other idea is that virtue is part of the agent’s happiness or flourishing, and that it is plausible to see virtue as actively constituting (wholly or in part) that happiness.\textsuperscript{25}

Many of these aspects of Annas’ account can also be found in other neo-Aristotelian approaches.

In contrast, Adams’ account is decidedly less Aristotelian. He defines a moral virtue as a ‘persisting excellence in being for the good. . . . A virtuous person, a morally good person, will of course be for good things and against bad things—and not in just any way, but excellently.’\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, he understands being for the good to involve a disposition to favor the good in action, desire, emotion, and feeling. While the central idea that a virtue is a disposition towards excellence is one which ‘has never been seriously questioned,’\textsuperscript{27} Adams understands the excellence in question quite differently than does Annas. One difference is that, unlike Annas, he doesn’t define a virtue in terms of its being instrumental in promoting human flourishing or happiness. His is an ‘excellence-based theory,’ according to which the virtues are worth having primarily for their own sake. Although he doesn’t deny that a virtue can contribute to flourishing or well-being, virtue is not to be measured by the level of flourishing or well-being achieved. In fact, he defines what it means for something to be an excellence in terms of intrinsic value: ‘excellence is the objective and non-instrumental goodness of that which is worthy to be honored, loved, admired, or (in the extreme case) worshiped, for its own sake.’\textsuperscript{28} Second, Adams also rejects the unifying role of practical wisdom among the virtues. (More on this issue in the next section.) A third difference between their accounts illustrates another point of contention among virtue ethicists: Annas seeks to develop her theory of virtue in a way that is largely

\textsuperscript{24} Annas (2011), 9.  \textsuperscript{25} Annas (2011), 1.  
\textsuperscript{26} Adams (2006), 15.  \textsuperscript{27} Zagzebski (1996), 85.  
\textsuperscript{28} Adams (2006), 24. The reader should also keep in mind that Adams differentiates the ‘ethics of virtue’ from ‘virtue ethics.’ The latter attempts to reduce the conception of rightness (or obligation) to goodness as involving virtue; he intends his work only to be the former. See Adams (2006), 6.
independent from a theory of human nature, and Adams is less optimistic that this can be done.

It is not our goal in this section to adjudicate between these (or any) conceptions of what a virtue *is*; nor have we imposed a single understanding on the chapters which follow. But it is important to keep in mind that exactly how a person understands the nature of a virtue will have an impact on not only what virtues she thinks there are, but how individual virtues should best be understood.

The Interconnection of the Virtues

Most virtue theorists have thought that there is a connection between having one virtue and having others. The strongest form of this connection is the unity of the virtues thesis, sometimes also called the 'identity of the virtues thesis,' which holds that all of the apparently different virtues are really just one single thing overarching virtue. Plato is sometimes interpreted as endorsing the unity of the virtues in the *Protagoras*, where the single virtue is 'knowledge of good and evil.' Gary Watson writes that 'nowadays the unity thesis is mostly ridiculed or ignored.' Not only does this thesis conflate the plausible distinction between the moral and the intellectual virtues, it just seems implausible on empirical grounds. For one, it would rule out cases of weakness of will where the agent has the relevant practical wisdom about what should be done yet fails to do it. Second, it appears to many that an individual could have the virtue of, say, temperance, while not also having the virtue of magnanimity. Peter Geach thinks the unity thesis is obviously problematic for this kind of reason:

if a man is manifestly affected with one vice, then any virtue he may seem to have is only spurious, and really he is vicious in this respect too. . . . The world would present a very terrible aspect if we had to think that any-one who is morally faulty by reason of one habitual grave defect must be totally devoid of virtue; that any virtues such faulty people seem to have are worthless; that any-one who is morally faulty by reason of one habitual grave defect must be totally devoid of virtue; that any virtues such faulty people seem to have are worthless shams.

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29 See Devereux (2006), 325.
30 See, for instance, Penner (1973). For a different interpretation, see Vlastos (1972) and Kremm (2009). Plato’s discussion of the cardinal virtues in the *Republic*, however, seems to be in conflict with the unity of the virtues thesis.
31 Watson (1984), 57.
33 Geach (1969), 163.
A slightly weaker claim than the unity of the virtues thesis is the reciprocity thesis; according to this thesis, while there are multiple virtues, they come as a necessary package. Raymond Devettere, for example, endorses this view:

> If you have one virtue, you have them all. . . . Virtues cannot be separated—a person lacking the virtue of temperance also lacks the virtues of justice, love, and so forth. At first, this thesis appears counterintuitive, but once the central role of practical wisdom in each and every moral virtue is understood, the unity of the virtues emerges as inevitable.

But even here, one might think this is too strong, for it certainly seems possible that a particular individual could be temperate in her desires but not courageous. One might even think that the having of one virtue, such as magnanimity, might in fact disincline an individual toward having another virtue, such as humility. Though we don’t have the space to pursue adequately these worries here, these concerns over the unity of the virtues and reciprocity theses seem fundamentally right to us.

One could reject the reciprocity thesis and yet still think that the virtues are interconnected. Julia Annas, for example, gives the following reason to think the virtues are interconnected:

Another important indication of the nature of virtue comes from the point that we can’t teach the virtues in isolation, one by one, since they can’t be learned that way. Generosity gives us a good example here. A child doesn’t learn to be generous by just giving her things away, or sharing things whether they belong to her or not. Generosity involves considerations of fairness and justice. For, as Aristotle points out, generosity requires taking from the right sources as well as giving to the right people in the right way. And ‘giving in the right way’ involves a great deal. Giving a gift which is indifferent to what the recipient wants is not generous. Generosity requires intelligence about what people both need and want, and also about appropriate ways, times, and manners of giving, avoiding obtrusiveness and condescension. Generosity thus requires, at the least, benevolence, a real interest in other people, their needs, and their wants.

Annas raises another reason to think that the vices are interconnected, this one built on the role of practical wisdom. Annas thinks that it is obvious that practical wisdom is unified over a person’s entire moral life; there are not independent practical wisdoms each of which governs a distinct virtue or

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34 Adams refers to this as ‘the mutual entailment of the virtues’ (2006), 171 and Devereux calls it ‘the inseparability view’ (2006) 325.
35 Devettere (2002), 64. See also McDowell (1979).
36 Annas (2011), 84. To be clear, Annas herself thinks these considerations favor the reciprocity thesis, as is made clear by the context of the quotation. Adams rejects even this unifying notion of practical wisdom in his (2006), 184–9. MacIntyre (1999) seems to subscribe to a version similar to Annas when he claims that in order for us to find another person ‘trustworthy’ there are a number of qualities that converge for us to make such a judgment.
virtue cluster. Such a view would, she writes, fail to ‘produce an integrated view of the values in a person’s life as a whole.’ Gary Watson, on the other hand, thinks that the sensitivity that comes from practical wisdom only establishes a weak interconnection among the virtues: ‘if you have any virtue, you will have some sensitivity for considerations relevant to the others—you will have, in one sense, all the virtues “to some degree.”’ This unifying role of prudence, in either the stronger version endorsed by Annas or the weaker endorsed by Watson, is explored in a number of chapters in this volume.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE VIRTUES

Not only is there disagreement with the Traditional View about how best the virtues and the relationship between them should be understood, but there is also significant disagreement about whether or not the Traditional View is even on the right track. One major source of criticism is motivated by the idea that normative ethics ought to be constrained by the best currently available psychological data. According to this view, theories of moral character ought to be constrained in certain regards by what social and cognitive psychology tells us moral agents are actually like. And recent empirical work suggests that agents lack the kind of robust moral character at the heart of the Traditional View. In this section, we lay out this challenge and indicated possible avenues of response to the challenge. We certainly do not take the brief treatment here to be exhaustive, but rather to simply raise criticisms to what seems to be the historically dominant way of understanding the virtues.

Recently, a number of philosophers and social scientists have begun to question the very presuppositions that robust theories of moral character and moral character traits are based on; their concern is that it rests on an empirically inadequate view of human agents. The following quotation by John Doris captures this concern:

I regard this renaissance of virtue with concern. Like many others, I find the lore of virtue deeply compelling, yet I cannot help noticing that much of this lore rests on psychological theory that is some 2,500 years old. A theory is not bad simply because it is old, but in this case developments of more recent vintage suggest that the old ideas are in trouble. In particular, modern experimental psychology has

37 Annas (2011), 88. Annas argues, for this kind of consideration, for a ‘filter test’ which would enable us to differentiate ‘traits which may well be admirable, popular, valued, and more, but which are not virtues’ (97). The idea here is that, given her view of the interconnection of the virtues, one can decide whether or not X is a virtue or merely otherwise admirable trait by evaluating whether one could have the clear virtues without having X or vice versa.

38 Watson (1984), 60.

39 See, for instance, the chapters by Wood and Boyd in this volume.
discovered that circumstance has surprisingly more to do with how people behave than traditional images of character and virtue allow.\textsuperscript{40}

This criticism of the Traditional View began with attributionism, a branch of psychology that seeks to differentiate what is rightly attributable to an individual’s character from what is rightly attributable to outside features. Much of attribution theory attributes a significantly higher proportion of the causal basis of behavior to external factors and less to moral character than traditionally thought. According to such theorists, most individuals overestimate the role of dispositional factors such as moral character in explaining an individual’s behavior, and underestimate the role the situation plays in explaining an agent’s behavior. Gilbert Harmon expresses this idea as follows:

In trying to characterize and explain a distinctive action, ordinary thinking tends to hypothesize a corresponding distinctive characteristic of the agent and tends to overlook the relevant details of the agent’s perceived situation. . . . Ordinary attributions of character traits to people are often deeply misguided and it may even be the case that there . . . [are] no ordinary traits of the sort people think there are.\textsuperscript{41}

Philosophers such as Doris and Harman have used this work in the social sciences to develop an alternative approach to moral character, commonly known as ‘Situationism.’

Like the Traditional View, Situationism can be understood as comprised of three central claims:

1. Non-robustness Claim: moral character traits are not robust—that is, they are not consistent across a wide spectrum of trait-relevant situations. Whatever moral character traits an individual has are situation-specific.

2. Consistency Claim: although a person’s moral character traits are relatively stable over time, this should be understood as consistency of situation specific traits, rather than robust traits.

3. Fragmentation Claim: a person’s moral character traits lack a strong correlation between having a particular virtue (or vice) and having others. There may be considerable disunity in a person’s moral character among her situation-specific character traits.

Thus, Situationism rejects the first and third claims of the Traditional View, and embraces only a modified version of the second claim. According to Situationists, the empirical evidence favors their view of moral character over the Traditional View. To cite just one early example, Hartshorne and May’s study of the trait of honesty among school children found no cross-

\textsuperscript{40} Doris (2002), ix. \textsuperscript{41} Harman (1999), 315f.
situational correlation. A child may be consistently honest with his friends, but not with his parents or teachers. From this and other studies, Hartshorne and May concluded that character traits are not robust but rather ‘specific functions of life situations.’ Other studies further call into question the Integrity Claim of the ‘Traditional View.

Some virtue theorists have responded to the challenge of Situationism. Some claim, for instance, that the attempt to base the normative claims of any theory—whether it be a form of virtue ethics or not—runs the risk of illicitly moving from ‘is’ to ‘ought.’ That is, simply because studies may—or may not—indicate the relative consistency of character traits in different contexts, it does not follow that the theory itself is in question. The transition from fact to value cannot be made by a simple appeal to ‘empirical considerations.’ Others think that the empirical evidence doesn’t actually show that the virtues, as traditionally conceived, don’t exist. Robert Adams, for example, writes that while ‘this evidence . . . is significant for moral psychology, . . . it does not show that there are not actually any virtues.’ Others agree that the traditional understanding of virtue ought to be modified in light of the empirical evidence, but not to the degree that Situationists claim.

This is, of course, nothing more than a quick summary of a growing exchange between social psychology and virtue ethics. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that if the virtues are to be examples of human excellence, a proper understanding of them ought to take into consideration all the relevant human sciences.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF VIRTUES AND VICES

The previous sections intend to, among other things, motivate the normative focus on the virtues and vices, despite the various permutations that such a focus can take. But even if one accepts the general constraints of what we’ve been calling ‘a virtue-approach to ethics,’ that by itself does little to give content to what the virtues that an individual should be pursuing are, nor how they are to be understood. There are a number of different ways that virtues and their corresponding vices can be classified. In what follows, we consider the historically most common and influential classifications of virtues. Sections I through IV each focus on one class of virtues: the cardinal virtues, the virtues opposed to the capital vices, a number of epistemic virtues,

42 Hartshorne and May (1928), 379f.
44 Adams (2006), 12.
Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd

and the theological virtues. Within each of these sections, the various contributors not only discuss the nature of the virtue in question, but also address some of the vices opposing those virtues. Section V deals not with particular virtues and vices, but instead considers some of the ways that reflection on the virtue extends beyond ethics to other related disciplines. As with the earlier sections, our goal in this final section isn’t to develop a unified account of virtue ethics or theory of virtue; rather, our aim is to make it clear how treatment of particular virtues impacts not only moral theory, but a wide range of related disciplines.

The Cardinal Virtues

The first section of the volume is dedicated to the cardinal virtues. The list of virtues that have come to be known as ‘cardinal virtues’ goes back at least as far as Plato. In the Laws, for example, Plato writes that ‘Wisdom is the chief and leader [of the virtues]: next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice.’ And the discussion of the good soul in the Republic also contains an extended discussion of these four virtues. Here, Plato famously thinks that the virtues in individuals have their parallel in the well-ordered city: ‘There will be more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to discern. So, if you are willing, let’s first find out what sort of thing justice is in cities, and afterward look for it in the individual.’ So Plato also thinks that the good city is one that must be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. Although Aristotle retains all the virtues on Plato’s list of cardinal virtues, he doesn’t single out these virtues as distinct from the other virtues, and places prudence, as an intellectual virtue, as the chief among them. The first use of the term ‘cardinal’ to refer to these four virtues appears to be found in the fourth century AD in the writings of St. Ambrose: ‘Hic quattuor velut virtutes amplexus est cardinales.’ In Latin, cardo means ‘hinge’ or ‘that on which a thing turns’ as its principal point. The cardinal virtues soon came to be understood as the main virtues under which all the other virtues can be subsumed. Aquinas, for instance, described the cardinal virtues as the ‘chief’ virtues, indicating that they ‘especially claim for themselves what commonly belongs to all virtues.’ These four virtues thus contain the common qualities

45 Laws I. 631.
46 Interestingly enough, in Protagoras, Plato adds another virtue to prudence, temperance, courage, and justice: piety (or holiness); see 330b.
47 Republic, 368e–369b.
48 Republic, 427e.
49 Rickaby (1908). See also Ambrose (2001), 133.
50 That is, the intellectual and moral virtues. The theological virtues are usually taken to be distinct insofar as they are infused by God, rather than acquired. See the relevant section below.
51 ST II-II 123.11, as quoted in Regan (2005), 111.
of all other moral virtues. According to Aquinas, since each of the cardinal virtues perfects one of the various capacities of the soul (i.e. the intellect, the will or intellectual appetite, the concupiscible appetite, and the irascible appetite), each of the other virtues can be subsumed under one of these four.52

The volume begins with W. Jay Wood’s ‘Prudence,’ which is not only an excellent introduction to the foremost of the cardinal virtues, but also illustrates a number of key themes the reader will find throughout the rest of the volume: (a) how a particular account of a virtue will be tied to a larger theory about what the virtues are and, in many cases, an account of the human good; and (b) the close connection between the moral and intellectual virtues. Regarding the first of these two issues, Wood approaches prudence primarily through Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, exploring ways in which the theological framework of the latter is responsible for places where Thomas disagrees with the Philosopher about the nature of prudence. For both of them, prudence is practical wisdom about what is to be done, directing one to the excellent human life, even though they disagree about the exact form that the excellent human life takes. Prudence is defective when it is inconsistent with genuine human flourishing. Regarding (b), Wood shows how, for both Aristotle and Aquinas, while the moral virtues are not identical with intellectual virtues, they must be joined with, and informed by, prudence. The moral virtues cannot properly aim the individual at their objects without the individual knowing, via prudence, what those objects are. But intellectual virtues such as prudence are also informed and shaped by properly tuned desires, emotions, and the will. In the discussion of the connection between the moral and intellectual virtues, Wood also shows how moral vices can lead to intellectual vices opposed to prudence, such as cunning, cleverness, and negligence.

The second essay is David Schmidtz’s and John Thrasher’s ‘The Virtues of Justice.’ Schmidtz and Thrasher do not attempt to delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for the virtue of justice, in part because they think that justice can be understood in a number of different ways: as a virtue of individuals and as a feature of social institutions. They reject Plato’s claim from the Republic that justice in a polis is simply justice in the individual ‘writ large’; they do, however, think that the two conceptions of justice are closely related in at least two ways. First, the just individual will want to be a contributing part to a just polis. But Schmidtz and Thrasher argue that the two are also related in the other direction as well: a just polis will be one which helps to produce just individuals. Thus, while not endorsing the identity between individual and communal justice that marks Plato’s view, they also reject those modern views which seek to divorce the two conceptions of justice.

52 See, for example, Aquinas (2005).
from each other. In this regard, they argue for a third related conception of justice that helps to bridge the gap between the two other conceptions, insofar as the goodness of ‘mere’ justice as primarily a negative virtue can be in the good of the community.

Daniel McInerny’s 'Fortitude and the Conflict of Frameworks' considers the cardinal virtue of fortitude, or courage, from a variety of perspectives. His ultimate purpose in doing so is to discover the conceptual connections that hold between these perspectives in order to discern from them the truth about the nature of courage. The first of the three accounts of courage that he explores is the ancient conception of courage associated with the warrior. While one can find this account in numerous places, McInerny takes Beowulf as his paradigmatic expression. The second account of courage he examines is that found in Thomas Aquinas, according to which fortitude is the disposition which 'binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things.' McInerny thinks that fortitude involves not only the disposition to endure evil, but that it 'likewise demands that we attack evils well, that is with moderation, in order to win safety for the future. Thus again, fortitude has to do both with restraining fear and moderating acts of daring.' For Aquinas, fortitude thus has four integral parts: patience and perseverance when it comes to enduring evil, and magnanimity and magnificence when it comes to attacking it. Furthermore, Aquinas understands the ultimate act of fortitude to be not a soldier’s death on the battlefield, but rather martyrdom. The third conception of fortitude is found in Western modernity; Alasdair MaClntyre has famously argued that it is characterized by the abandonment of natural teleology. Deprived of a natural telos, which is integral to the two previous conceptions, courage becomes reduced to a quest for authenticity. We find this quest, McInerny suggests, vividly portrayed in Steve Jobs’ 2005 Stanford University commencement address. Drawing on the work of MacIntyre as providing a way of comparing competing frameworks, McInerny ends by exploring comparative strengths and weaknesses of these three approaches.

Robert Roberts’ chapter on temperance concludes the section on the cardinal virtues. Loosely following Aristotle’s treatment of sôphroneô in the Nicomachean Ethics, Roberts takes temperance to be the virtue which governs the appetites for food, drink, or sexual activity insofar as they are governed by right reason. He shows how, given its connection to the flourishing of the individual, an account of temperance needs to presuppose a conception of human physical health, even though he does not wed his treatment of temperance to any particular conception of human physical health. He then goes on

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53 ST II-II.123.4. 54 This volume, page 84.
to show how it is possible to train the physical appetites involved in temperance so that they can come to be controlled by right reason. With an account of the virtue in hand, he then focuses his attention on the vice of intemperance, differentiating it from the modern concept of an addiction. He ends by showing temperance’s close connection with other virtues—not only prudence, but justice as well. Roberts’ essay thus represents an excellent model of the interconnection of the virtues we discussed earlier in this introduction.

The Capital Vices and the Corrective Virtues

A capital vice is a vice which directs a person towards an end and encourages the development of other vices in a person to achieve that end. Rebecca DeYoung’s Glittering Vices serves as an excellent introduction to the capital vices, including the history of this particular grouping of vices. DeYoung’s book recounts how the reflection on the capital vices and their corresponding virtues originated in the Christian monastic tradition and developed into a central element of medieval Christian ethics and spiritual formation. The list appears to have originated with Evagrius on Pontus (346–399 AD). Cassian, one of Evagrius’ pupils, treated the vices more systematically than did his teacher and referred to them as ‘principia vitia,’ highlighting their ability to serve as the source of other offspring vices: ‘There are eight principle faults which attack mankind; viz. first gastrimargia, which means gluttony, second fornication, thirdly philargyria, i.e. avarice or the love of money, fourthly anger, fifthly dejection, sixthly acedia, i.e. listlessness or low spirits, seventhly cenodoxia, i.e. boasting or vain glory, and eighthly pride.’

Gregory the Great’s treatment in the sixth century pared the list down to seven, replacing dejection with envy, and treating pride as the root of the other seven. Gregory describes the capital vices’ relationship to pride as follows:

Pride is the commander of the army of the devil, and its offspring are the seven principle vices. All the vices that assail us are invisible soldiers against us in a battle of pride which rules over them; of these, some precede as leaders, others typically follow as the army. For not all vices take possession of the heart with equal effect. Rather, after a few great faults enter a neglected soul, countless lesser vices pour into the soul in waves. For pride itself is the queen of the vices, which, once it has completely seized and vanquished the soul, hands the battle over to the seven principle vices, as to its commanders. After these leaders of the army

55 Some vices, e.g. gluttony, do not simply encourage the development of other vices, but produce other vices as effects of achieving their desired ends. For example, according to Aquinas, restlessness and callousness are effects of greed, since trying to find satisfaction in one’s own consumable and transient possessions tends to leave a person discontented, as well as more inclined to selfishly overlook the needs of others in favor of one’s own accumulation of wealth.

56 As quoted in DeYoung (2009) 36.
follow troublesome multitudes of vices, which undoubtedly arise from them. We will understand this better if we enumerate these leaders and their armies as we are able. Truly pride is the root of all evil. . . . Her first progeny are the seven principle vices, which proceed from this venomous root, and they are: vainglory, envy, anger, sorrow, greed, gluttony, and lust.57

The current list of seven—lust, gluttony, avarice, sloth, wrath, envy, and pride—comes from Aquinas’ treatment in Summa Theologiae IaIIae 84.3–4 when Aquinas collapses sloth and dejection, and treats vainglory as a species of pride. This list of these vices would come to be known more commonly as the capital vices, a term derived from the Latin caput or ‘head,’ a metaphor which can be seen in the description above of these vices as the principle and director of other vices.58 According to DeYoung,

Capital vices are defined in the tradition as vices which serve as fertile sources of other characteristic vices. They serve as final causes, orienting the person to a false conception of happiness and organizing patterns of thought, desire, and action around that end. The list of seven (or eight) vices was later designated the seven deadly sins, but this title has a different meaning, since ‘deadly’ refers to the distinction in Catholic moral theology between mortal and venial sin. Writers on the sins such as Thomas Aquinas deny that every act of a particular vice necessarily constitutes a mortal sin.59

Though often confused with ‘the seven deadly sins,’ the capital vices are better thought of as a particular class of vices which serve as the root or source of other vices, just as pride is often thought to be the root or source of all the vices. Though the capital vices are primarily associated with medieval Catholic accounts of virtue and vice, as the readings in this section indicate, both the vices and the corrective virtues associated with them are fertile soil for contemporary reflection.

The section on the capital vices opens with Colleen McCluskey’s ‘Lust and Chastity.’ McCluskey’s chapter shows how a number of contemporary treatments of sexual desire—such as that offered by Simon Blackburn—view lust as the virtue and chastity as the vice, contrary to the capital vice tradition. She begins by exploring the roots of the reflection on lust as a capital vice in the desert monastic tradition mentioned above. Even those Christian monks who took the strongest line against lust insisted that sexual desire in and of itself was not vicious, but good. Sexual desire becomes lust when it becomes inordinately strong and distracts one from higher goods. The monastic fathers’ and mothers’ practical reflection on the dangers of sexual desire

57 Moralia in Iob 31.45.87–90.
58 Aquinas also writes that ‘those sins are capital which have ends chiefly desirable as such, so that other sins are subordinate to such ends’ (De Malo VIII.1.ad).
59 This volume, page 178, note 5.
would be developed into a larger theoretical framework by the Middle Ages. In general, for Aquinas, a human acts virtuously when she acts in a way that (a) is in accordance with right reason and (b) which promotes flourishing. Sexual desire, in particular, is in accord with reason when it contributes to the good of the species, rather than the individual—that is, when it is aimed at procreation within a properly ordered relationship (that is, marriage). Excessive sexual desire, then, moves the individual to engage in sexual activities that are not aimed at the good of the species’ procreation. As a result, those sexual activities which are aimed merely at pleasure (even within what Aquinas would take as a proper marriage relationship) are disordered. The virtue of chastity, on the other hand, moderates sexual desire by keeping it aligned with the order of reason. McCluskey distances herself from certain aspects of Aquinas’ account, such as the claim that sexual desire needs to be aimed at procreation and not just pleasure to be virtuous and that contraception is always immoral. But she also rejects recent attempts to redefine lust as virtuous; her main foil here is Simon Blackburn, though a number of others have developed similar views. Part of the ostensible disagreement between the traditional view and the recent proposals as exemplified by Blackburn is terminological; but she then argues that Aquinas’ view can better account for how vicious sexual desire can result in objectification. The desire for sexual activity apart from the love of friendship objectifies one’s sexual partner; sexual activity solely for pleasure and not aimed at the good for friendship (which includes commitment) between individuals thus turns out to be vicious on McCluskey’s account. She thus defends a modified version of the traditional account of lust and chastity, though one which admittedly includes a wider range of acceptable sexual activities and desires than Aquinas thought possible.

The next chapter also concerns a capital vice opposed to the cardinal virtue of temperance. In ‘Gluttony and Abstinence,’ Robert Kruschwitz treats the virtue of abstinence as more than just about our disposition to not eat too much, but rather in a holistic orientation of the individual to know and rightly desire the good. It is true that gluttony is the disposition for sensory pleasures associated with eating and drinking that has become disordered because it is directed toward something that is not good once all the relevant factors are. But Kruschwitz also shows how gluttony and the behaviors that it leads to are connected with justice and hospitality. The connection to justice is easily seen when one considers the impact that the typical American diet’s over-reliance on factory-farmed meat has on the environment and national health. Kruschwitz also considers how gluttony is, and more importantly is not, related to a number of biomedical issues, such as genetic predispositions towards excessive appetites. He ends with a discussion of how certain practices associated with abstinence, such as fasting, can help train one’s physical appetites.

Andrew Pinsent begins his ‘Avarice and Liberality’ by distinguishing the capital vice of greed from the contemporary tendency to broaden its meaning
to include its offspring vices, the general desire to have more, and various forms of injustice. The restricted understanding of avarice Pinsent focuses on is the disposition to overvalue money or possessions under the aspect of financial value. He notes a number of ways in which the desire for material wealth is unlike the desires for food, drink, and sex, a comparison that other treatments of avarice often make. Largely because of these differences, examination of the vice of avarice faces what Pinsent calls ‘the failure of the rational mean’: namely the fact that any attempt to address the question, “How much should I possess in order to live a virtuous life?” throws back a spectrum of answers.\footnote{This volume, page 164.} To help demarcate how and when the disposition for material wealth is vicious, Pinsent draws on recent work on prosopagnosia, or face blindness, and argues that avarice is vicious because it inhibits, or even destroys, second-personal relatedness with others. Money is particularly prone to such destruction because by its nature as a medium of exchange it reduces goodness to a single quantitative assessment, thereby encouraging a reductive outlook regarding value. Avarice thus counts against an individual’s flourishing because it inhibits the individual’s relatedness to and love for others.

In his treatment of the capital vices in the Purgatorio, Dante described lust, gluttony, and avarice as involving excessive or immoderate desire or love for things that we should love. In contrast, he thinks that sloth involves lax love, or the failure to be properly moved by the love or desire of things that we should be moved by. In her ‘Sloth: Some Historical Reflections on Laziness, Effort, and Resistance to the Demands of Love,’ Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung shows how the capital vice tradition understands sloth to be much more—and much worse—than mere laziness. Tracing the history of acedia from its desert monastic roots through medievals such as Gregory the Great and Aquinas, she shows how the original understanding of sloth as a failure of spiritual commitment to what one knows one ought to do has been stripped and secularized to mere inertia or lack of effort. The corrective virtue, diligence, is also more than mere industriousness; it’s a sign of proper love and devotion, ultimately to God and the loving relationships he calls us to. DeYoung also shows how a certain kind of industriousness—which she describes as frantic busyness and restless escapism—can itself be an expression of sloth insofar as it is an attempt to avoid the demands of love. DeYoung advocates a return to the historical conception of sloth, since this more robust understanding helps us see how both inactivity and intentional diversion can express resistance to charity.

Zac Cogley’s ‘A Study of Virtuous and Vicious Anger’ adopts a roughly Aristotelian approach to the emotion of anger. Cogley’s goal is to develop an
account of what differentiates virtuous anger from vicious anger in a way that is informed by both philosophical psychology and recent empirical studies. Cogley explores three functions that anger can serve. First, anger is an appraisal that a particular situation is illegitimate, wrong, unjust, or otherwise wrong. Anger is not only an emotional reaction to a situation, but it is also a motivational source in response to that situation. Cogley argues that anger often should produce motivation to work toward realizing a morally laudatory purpose, such as fighting against injustice. (Two of Cogley’s recurrent examples of virtuous anger are Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr, who both used their anger to fight against social injustice and oppression.) Finally, anger serves a communicative social function, providing for emotional engagement with and transformation of others.

Within this understanding of the functions of anger, Cogley argues that anger is virtuous only when it is excellent with respect to each of these three functions: ‘her anger is fitting, it motivates her to take assertively resistant actions, and she communicates her anger to others with nuanced attention to social norms governing its display.’ Anger which lacks excellence in any of these functions will be vicious; there are thus a plethora of ways to be vicious with respect to anger. Cogley’s chapter ends with a discussion of two characteristic vices associated with anger: meekness and wrath. The meek person is an individual who is deficient with respect to all three of anger’s functions: he fails to feel sufficient fitting anger, his anger fails to motivate him to work to change the situation, and he doesn’t express his own anger and experience the anger of others properly. The wrathful individual, on the other hand, is excessive with respect to each of these functions: she feel excessively angry given the situation she is in, acts aggressively and impulsively on her anger, and is quick to communicate her own and others’ anger in a way that is socially inappropriate. Whereas the meek individual is disposed to not taking himself seriously as a moral agent, the wrathful individual is morally overconfident and insensitive.

Not only philosophers, but also psychologists and economists have devoted energy to studying envy. The nature of envy, however, has been understood in quite disparate ways, sometimes being understood primarily as a reason for action, an economic and social force, an emotion, as well as a vice. In ‘Envy and its Discontents,’ Perrine and Timpe seek to give an account of envy as a capital vice and then show how that account is related to the range of treatments of envy one finds in the literature. The vice of envy, most generally, is the disposition to desire that another lose her good. But this description fails to be a definition. They begin by examining Thomas Aquinas’ treatment of

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61 This volume, page 217. Cogley prefers not to use the term ‘patience’ to refer to the virtue perfecting one’s anger in order to avoid the contemporary connotations of passivity and quietude which the term often evokes.
envy in the *Summa Theologiae* and argue that Aquinas’ definition fails to properly mark off the complete class of envy from other nearby dispositions. They then modify Aquinas’ definition and they argue that envy should be understood as the disposition to sorrow over another’s good because of a perception of inferiority regarding the other’s good. They then draw on recent work in economics and psychology to show how the divisiveness of envy damages both the envious person and the larger community, treating a number of the offspring vices of envy, such as jealousy, covetousness, greed, and injustice. They end the chapter with a brief discussion of the corrective virtues that help an individual overcome envy.

The final chapter in this section is Craig A. Boyd’s ‘Pride and Humility: Tempering the Desire for Excellence.’ In this essay, Boyd argues that we can see a sharp distinction between Aristotelian magnanimity and the Christian virtue of humility. For Aristotle, the *megalopsychos* exemplified the pinnacle of morality. He is the self-sufficient paragon of virtue who gives to others but is reluctant to receive. In contrast to Aristotle’s depiction of the self-sufficient *megalopsychos*, the Christian tradition of Augustine and Aquinas offers an account of humility that sees this as a species of pride. To deny our reliance on others—especially God—is to deny reality. It is ‘right reason’ that enables us to see that we are part of an indispensible community wherein we depend tremendous on the giving and receiving of assistance. But right reason also takes into account all the relationships we have—including our relationship to God and so it is a propaedeutic to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. That is, the agent must first recognize her need for divine grace before being able to receive these infused virtues. Boyd argues that the Thomistic account of humility can be viewed as one of Alasdair MacIntyre’s ‘virtues of acknowledged dependence.’62 Without the healing work of humility, our relationship to God and to others remains irreparably severed.

**Intellectual Virtues**

The third section of the volume addresses a number of intellectual virtues. The current interest in intellectual virtue is more recent than the revival of virtue ethics. As mentioned above, Plato appears to have held that all the virtues are identical, that ‘knowledge of good and evil’ is ‘the whole of virtue,’ thereby turning all vice into ignorance.63 Aristotle’s differentiation between vice, incontinence, continence, and virtue entailed that it was possible for a person to possess intellectual virtue but not moral virtue. He also expanded the list of epistemic virtues in book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to include not only

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62 MacIntyre (1999).
63 *Laches* 199d–e.
phronēsis (translated into the Latin as prudentia), but also sophia, technē, epistêmê, and nous. Aquinas, following the Philosopher, endorsed this list:

[Aristotle] refers to his work on morals, that is Ethics 6, where he discusses the way science and art and wisdom and prudence and understanding differ. To put it briefly, wisdom and science and understanding are in the speculative part of the soul, where he here calls the scientific part of the soul. They differ in that understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration; science concerns conclusions about lesser things, whereas wisdom considers the first causes, so in the same place it is called the chief of the sciences. Prudence and art are in the practical part of the soul, which reasons about contingent things that can be done by us. But they differ, for prudence directs actions which do not pass into exterior matter but are perfections of the agent; hence prudence is called there right reason about things to be done. But art directs in making, which passes into exterior matter, such as to build and to say; hence art is called right reason about things to be made.64

For Aquinas, the intellectual virtues other than prudence (which, as seen above, is a cardinal virtue) are only virtues in a qualified sense insofar as they make individuals capable of good activities but are compatible with a bad will. The only exception here is prudence which, insofar as it is also a cardinal virtue as seen above, ‘is essentially connected with good desire and that is therefore essentially ordered to a good use of the intellectual capacity.’65

However, despite this historical connection, the past three decades have seen the development of explicitly virtue-based positions in epistemology, a development that has reinvigorated the connections between ethics and epistemology. Virtue epistemology can arguably be traced to Ernest Sosa’s work in the 1980s.66 Soon, Jonathan Kvanvig,67 James Montmarquet,68 and Linda Zagzebski69—among others—had devoted entire manuscripts to developing and defending virtue epistemology. Though these approaches, like virtue ethics itself, are diverse, there is a general unifying schema which Christopher Hookway describes as follows: virtue epistemologies are ‘(1) approaches to the most central problems of epistemology (2) which gives to states called “intellectual” or “epistemic” virtues (3) a central or “primary” explanatory role.’70 That is, these approaches have at their heart a commitment to various intellectual excellences in the process of belief acquisition and formation. As Zagzebski and DePaul describe it, ‘at a minimum, virtue epistemology is

64 In Meta 1, lecture 1, n. 34; as quoted in Hoffmann (2012), 329. Aquinas’ treatment of the intellectual virtues is significantly less tied to Aristotle in the Summa Theologiae, both in terms of how they are presented and how they are understood.
65 Hoffmann (2012), 328.
66 Many of Sosa’s early papers on intellectual virtue are collected in Sosa (1991), particularly parts III and IV.
70 Hookway (2003), 183.
characterized by a shift in focus from properties of beliefs to the intellectual traits of agents. The primary bearer of epistemic value is a quality of the agent that enables her to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way.\textsuperscript{71} Shortly thereafter they continue:

Virtue epistemologists understandably concentrate on the ways the idea of virtue can help resolve epistemological questions and leave the conceptual work of explaining value to ethics. Clearly, then, virtue epistemology needs virtue ethics. But... virtue ethics also has something important to learn from virtue epistemology. Perhaps due to historical accident, virtue ethicists have had little to say about intellectual virtue. They generally take for granted that the moral and intellectual virtues are not only distinct, but relatively independent.\textsuperscript{72}

In part because of the collection that the above quotation comes from, recent years have seen significant interaction between virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists that go beyond just the need for prudence in developing moral virtues. This connection is addressed in a number of places in the following chapters,\textsuperscript{73} but there are other relations between the epistemic and moral virtues as well.

In this section, we have departed from the Aristotelian list of the intellectual virtues. One reason is that \textit{phronēsis/prudentia} is treated in the section on the cardinal virtues. But we have also chosen to not include chapters devoted to \textit{technē} or \textit{epistêmê} given that they, as described above, are only virtues in a qualified sense. The section opens with an essay on trust by Linda Zagzebski. According to Zagzebski, trust comes in both practical and epistemic forms, but both forms are complex attitudes involving belief, feeling, and behavioral components. Epistemic trust, both in terms of self-trust and as placed in others, is pre-reflective and rationally inescapable if we’re to avoid skepticism. However, epistemic trust, according to Zagzebski, isn’t an intellectual virtue, in part because trust can be misplaced. But it is closely related to intellectual virtue in a number of important ways.\textsuperscript{74} First, many of the intellectual virtues presuppose epistemic trust and would not be virtues if it were not for the reasonableness of epistemic trust. Furthermore, many of the intellectual virtues are either enhancements of epistemic trust—as in the cases of intellectual courage, perseverance, and firmness—or—as in the cases of intellectual humility and open-mindedness—constraints on it. Zagzebski also elucidates ways that the intellectual virtues can help prevent trust from becoming either excessive or deficient.

The other two chapters in this section are traditional Aristotelian intellectual virtues, and both draw on the connections with virtue epistemology.

\textsuperscript{71} DePaul and Zagzebski (2003), 1. \textsuperscript{72} DePaul and Zagzebski (2003), 2. \textsuperscript{73} See not only the chapter on prudence, but also the chapter by Perrine and Timpe on envy and Boyd’s chapter on pride and humility. \textsuperscript{74} For another discussion of the close connection between trust and virtues, see Annas (2011), 73f.
mentioned above. First here is John Greco’s ‘Episteme: Knowledge and Understanding.’ Greco has two main goals in this chapter. The first is to argue that epistêmê is better translated as ‘understanding’ than as either ‘knowledge’ or ‘scientific knowledge.’ Insofar as Aristotle claims that one has epistêmê only if one can ‘give an account’ of the thing in question, epistêmê should not be understood as knowledge insofar as one can have knowledge of some true proposition even if one can’t give an account of why that proposition is true. While scientific knowledge does involve ‘giving an account,’ epistêmê differs from it in that one can have epistêmê of things that fall outside the scope of science’s domain. Greco then defends a neo-Aristotelian account of the nature of the intellectual virtue. Epistêmê, for Aristotle, requires that one ‘has the appropriate sort of confidence, and knows the principles.’ Greco argues that Aristotle’s notion of ‘cause’ should be replaced with dependence relations more generally (including, in addition to causal dependence, logical and supervenient relations). More specifically, to understand a thing is to be able to (knowledgeably) locate it in a system of appropriate dependence relations. Greco then defends this account from two objections, both of which deny that understanding is a kind of knowledge at all, and therefore cannot be understood as knowledge of dependence relations.

Jason Baehr’s ‘Sophia: Theoretical Wisdom and Contemporary Epistemology’ aims to shed light on the nature of sophia and why it should be seen as an intellectual virtue. He begins by giving reasons for why contemporary philosophers ought to care about sophia; he then delineates three different ways of understanding the nature of sophia, each of which he claims has some prima facie plausibility:

(a) as an understanding of sophia as involving the grasp of fundamental metaphysical truths and of various truths that follow from them, which he calls the ‘epistemic state’ conception;

(b) as the cognitive faculty or capacity in virtue of which a person can know or understand the content in question, which he calls the ‘cognitive faculty’ conception; and

(c) as a kind of personal orientation or character trait that is directed at and helps its possessor lay hold of these truths aimed at in the epistemic state conception, a conception which he calls the ‘intellectual trait’ conception.

Baehr then shows how each of these conceptions of sophia figures relative to various issues and debates in contemporary epistemology, such as epistemic significance, understanding, the value problem, reliabilism, and responsibilism. His goal in this section is to pave the way for renewed reflection on sophia and related epistemic concepts.

75 NE 1139b 34–5.
The Theological Virtues

The fourth section of the book addresses the most distinctive Christian contribution to the virtues: faith, hope, and charity.\textsuperscript{76} Paul the Apostle mentions that ‘These three remain: faith, hope, and love. But the greatest of these is love.’\textsuperscript{77} ‘The Christian tradition latched onto these three ‘virtues’ as the key point of differentiation between its own view on morality and those of the surrounding pagan culture.’\textsuperscript{78} This stemmed from basic theological beliefs about human nature, sin, and grace.

In contrast to the pagan tradition of antiquity, the early Christians saw themselves as fundamentally alienated from God and they could only be reconciled through the divine grace offered by Christ. Sin, therefore, was not merely ‘weakness of will’ or ignorance, but an alienation from God resulting from a ‘turning away’ from the true human good. Although human reason, on its own, was powerless to save the human soul, it could recognize its need for the salvation that could come only through the grace of God. Some thinkers, like Augustine, argued that there could be no virtue whatsoever without grace. Others, like Aquinas, held that pagans could practice a kind of ‘imperfect’ virtue.

Augustine says, ‘No one can have true virtue without true piety, that is without the true worship of God.’\textsuperscript{79} But for Augustine this meant that one first had to receive divine grace before any act whatsoever could be understood as ‘good.’ ‘Pagan virtue,’ such as it was, could not be considered true virtue because there was no recognition that God must be the one to whom all human activity is directed. Only by a conversio of the will (i.e. a ‘turning back to God’) could a human agent’s actions become virtuous. As a result, true beatitude could only be found in God.

Aquinas sees the distinction in terms of ‘imperfect’ and ‘perfect’ happiness. Certainly, Aristotle’s virtuous person could achieve a certain kind of ‘happiness’ in this mortal life by developing the cardinal virtues. But the problem is that humans are destined for the ‘perfect’ happiness of communion with God. Since sin prevents them from achieving this on their own they need the theological virtues. He says,

\textsuperscript{76} Pieper (1986) notes that ‘the English word for love is inadequate as we use it to cover too many activities. The Greek agapé or the Latin caritas better expresses the idea conveyed in the sense of love as a theological virtue.’
\textsuperscript{77} 1 Corinthians 13:13.
\textsuperscript{78} Wisdom 8:7 mentions the four cardinal virtues but they do not seem to play an important role in Christian thought until late antiquity or the early Middle Ages. Augustine’s On Free Choice of the Will briefly develops each of the four cardinal virtues and follows Aristotle’s ranking rather than Plato’s.
\textsuperscript{79} City of God V.19.213.
Certain additional principles must be given by God to man by which he can thus be ordered to supernatural happiness, just as by natural principles he is ordered to a connatural end, though not without divine help. The additional principles are called theological virtues: first, because they have God as their object, inasmuch by them we are rightly ordered to God; secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone; and finally, because these virtues are made known to us only by divine revelation in Sacred Scripture.80

Following Augustine, Aquinas contends that the agent needs to have God as the object of these virtues in order to have our lives ‘rightly ordered.’ Secondly, the agent acquires them not by her own efforts but by the ‘infusion’ of divine grace. They each may grow as a habit—as all virtues can—but they must first be given by God. Thirdly, we know of them only through the divine revelation of the Scriptures. Again, unaided natural reason could not discover these virtues on its own but needs the revelation of the Scriptures—as a witness to the grace of Christ—in order to know that the truly virtuous life is one of faith, hope, and charity.

These virtues were not merely ad hoc accretions to an already complete set of ‘secular Aristotelian virtues’ but transformed the moral and intellectual virtues at their core.81 Christian prudence is shaped by charity and faith to the extent that ‘right reason’ sees new relationships—e.g. with the divine trinity—that unaided natural reason could not even imagine. Humility and magnanimity see the tempering and striving for excellence in an entirely new way—with reference to one’s desire for the honors only God can bestow and with regard to one’s place in the universe vis-à-vis God and one’s neighbor.

The first chapter in this section, ‘Faith as Attitude, Trait, and Virtue’ is by Robert Audi who argues that we can distinguish faithfulness in three ways. First, we can consider it as an attitude as when we speak of someone who has ‘faith in’ another person or an institution. This is not properly a moral use of the term. A second use of the term can be one of a ‘trait.’ Here, we mean that a person has a kind of loyalty to another person whether or not that other person is morally good or not. The primary element here is that faith is a kind of ‘allegiance’ to another. And a third notion of faith is as a psychological virtue. Audi believes there are six important conceptual dimensions to the idea of a virtue of character: situational, conceptual, cognitive, motivational, behavioral, and teleological. From this point he argues that there are two kinds of virtues: moral and non-moral. Moral virtues are valuable in themselves and so we find justice and honesty. Others are non-moral (or ‘adjunctive’) and here we find courage and conscientiousness, which can be found in very immoral individuals.

80 S T I-II.57.1.
81 For a worthwhile discussion of the relationship between the theology and moral virtues in Aquinas, see Pinsent (2011).
Faithfulness seems to be an adjunctive virtue as it adheres to persons—while not necessarily judging the moral character of those persons. As directed toward God and neighbor (i.e. as a ‘theological’ virtue) it is both a virtue of character since it is grounded in love and a moral virtue in the sense that it has an egalitarian concern for others. So religious faith can be a character trait or a kind of attitude towards God. But it can also be construed as a virtue of personality. In this last case, faith has God as the right kind of ‘object’ and integrates the believer’s life accordingly.

Charles Pinches ‘On Hope’ develops the idea that hope is not merely an animal or human emotion but a theological virtue that orients the self to God. In a generic sense hope (1) is a ‘tensed’ emotion, and (2) aims at a ‘difficult good.’ It is tensed in the sense that we recognize something we do not presently have but wish to attain in the future and so there is a temporal gap between our initial desire and the attainment of the object of our hope. It also aims at a difficult good. I do not hope for air but I do hope for a long life. But what distinguishes ‘natural hope’ from the theological virtue of hope is the ‘object.’ And the object of hope as an ‘emotion’ can be any end—good or bad—that an agent may desire. However, the ‘object’ of hope as a theological virtue is communion with God.

Hope ‘expects’ and ‘waits for’ what faith affirms. In this sense, faith is a theological virtue of the intellect since it informs us of the truth about God. But hope is a virtue of desire since it concerns the ‘difficult good,’ but what is unique about hope is that it ‘leans on God’ for its help. This leaning on God ties hope together with charity since we hope for communion with God in the beatific vision. Yet, this hope is not only for the next life but applies to this one as well. In the last section of this essay Pinches shows how theological hope can shape and inform Christian politics by rejecting the ‘false hopes’ promised by utopian societies or by ‘scientific progress.’

In the final essay of this section, Paul Wadell’s ‘Charity: How Friendship with God Unfolds in Love for Others,’ the discussion once again focuses upon an interesting comparison-contrast of Aristotle with Aquinas. Aristotle claims that friendship plays a central role in the moral life but believes that friendship with God would be absurd. Aquinas, however, takes the idea of friendship as a ‘participation’ in the life of the other and applies it to the triune God of Christianity. For Aristotle there was an unfathomable gulf between the human and the divine since ‘friendship’ could only be had between ‘equals.’ But Christ bridges that gulf in grace so that God draws the creature into participation in divine beatitude. As a result, grace not only enables us to be ‘friends’ with God but elevates us so that we can become ‘participants’ in the divine life itself.

Genuine charity does not merely love God for God’s own sake—which it does—but also implies that we love others as we love ourselves. That is, we come to love the neighbor as a ‘second self’ in that we come to desire the good
of ‘friendship with God’ for the neighbor. But we also love others because God loves them. That is, when we love a friend we come to love those whom the friend loves—and in this way love ‘unfolds’ to others—even for those whom we may have a natural enmity. And so charity enables us to move beyond our ‘natural’ predilections for those whom we instinctively love to love for our enemies. The ways in which love ‘unfolds’ for others is through the practices of mercy, kindness, and almsgiving.

Virtues in Other Disciplines

Philosophy does not hold a monopoly on the study of the virtues. Other disciplines, especially theology and psychology, have taken an interest in these issues, as character traits seem pliable enough to function in a variety of disciplinary contexts.

In the first essay in this section, ‘Virtue in Theology,’ Stephen Pope begins by noting that theology is not like any other discipline because it requires the participation of the practitioner in the subject. That is, theology is a discipline that requires belief prior to its reflection; in this it follows the famous dictum ‘credo ut intelligam.’ It arises out of the life of the community’s reflection on the covenantal relationship with God and the community’s ‘journey to God.’ As such, theology sees the virtues not only as helps for the present life but also as habits that prepare us for a deeper communion with God in the life to come. This communion with God is the source of true human happiness. As with most contemporary philosophy of religion, Pope approaches God in light of the Judeo-Christian tradition; while much of what he says may also be applicable to other religious traditions, it is clear from his chapter that he is allowing the particular theological tradition he’s working within to shape his treatment. Although the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures speak more to list of commands, admonitions, proverbs, and parable, they provide a rich tapestry to draw upon for a study of the virtues.\footnote{As mentioned above, the three most important of the Christian ‘virtues’ are the Pauline virtues of faith, hope, and love (1 Cor 13:13). Faith orients us to God on our journey; hope gives us courage for the journey; and charity sustains us on the journey by ‘going with, and to God’ with those whom we love. These ‘virtues’ for the journey also reform the cardinal virtues in ways that are directed towards God and to others rather than primarily to our own happiness. In this way, the theological virtues paradoxically bring us happiness: we attain happiness not by seeking it directly but by seeking it indirectly in the good for others. Pope’s essay, while summarizing some of the materials dealt with in greater detail elsewhere in.

\footnote{See for example, Meeks (1995).}
this volume, also shows how a focus on virtue can shape much of one’s theological reflection.

Christie Hartley and Lori Watson’s ‘Virtue in Political Thought: On Civic Virtue in Political Liberalism’ advances the idea that civic virtues are those that are central to social cooperation; as a result, any kind of political body requires these sorts of virtues even though they do not require ‘moral virtues.’ They contrast perfectionist and anti-perfectionist theories of the state. Perfectionist models, such as Aristotle’s, posit an objective good for human life and orient the society to that good. In contrast to these views, anti-perfectionist models along the lines of John Rawls believe the state should be ‘neutral’ concerning what constitutes an objective account of good life. Hartley and Watson defend a liberal understanding of political virtues in the tradition of Rawls who famously argued for a heteronomous account of the good.83 Because we can reasonably disagree about what constitutes the good life, we should advocate civic virtues such as fairness, civility, tolerance, and reasonableness. This assumes two ideas that are central to political liberalism: the public use of reason and reciprocity. The public use of reason concerns how people in a pluralist society argue for the same basic freedoms and opportunities from a political perspective and not those based on religious or other beliefs. Reciprocity means that we allow others the same freedoms we allow ourselves in their pursuit of the good and that they permit us the same freedoms. As a result, some virtues will necessarily shape political organizations. These will include fairness, tolerance, and reasonableness. But it is important to remember that on this view civic virtues are instrumental in a citizen’s pursuit of the good and not constitutive of it.

The third chapter in this section is, ‘Virtue in Positive Psychology,’ by Everett Worthington et al. They contend that positive psychology, the psychology of religion, and spirituality are interested in the study of virtue. These converging trends share a common core of concern with virtue and suggest that our knowledge of both the psychology of religion and spirituality and positive psychology could be enlarged by entering into more active dialogue among these fields.

Positive psychology, a relatively new discipline, has focused on three main areas: positive emotions, happiness, and character strengths. Religion, however, concerns the set of beliefs, practices, etc., of like-minded individuals. Spirituality, though, focuses on the personal experiences an individual has with a sacred object.

Although one can readily see that religion with its corporate concern for morality—and spirituality with its personal response to the sacred—would be

83 Rawls (1971), 554. Rawls says, ‘Although to subordinate all our aims to one end does not strictly speaking violate the principles of rational choice . . . it still strikes us as irrational, or more likely as mad. The self is put in the service of one of its ends for the sake of the system.’
linked closely to the development of virtue, this has not been so for psychology until recently. But psychologists have turned their attention to three areas particularly—cognitive psychology, a non-rational understanding of willpower, and a moral intuitionist model of moral emotion. These areas explore the importance of emotional and moral ‘set points’ that people can develop over time into positive character traits or virtues. In keeping with the traditional religious and philosophical understanding of the virtues one must practice the virtues repeatedly in order for them to develop appropriately.

James Van Slyke’s chapter on ‘Moral Psychology, Neuroscience, and Virtue: From Moral Judgment to Moral Character,’ explores the recent scholarship on the neuroscientific explanations of moral virtues. This work suggests a dual processing model of moral deliberation that appeals to both cognitive and affective mechanisms. But central to this work has been the discovery or ‘mirror neurons’ that enable humans (and other more developed animals) to mimic the activities and emotions of others. This ability to mimic others serves as a necessary condition for practical reason in the sense that our moral deliberation is an acquired skill much like that of a musician who mimics and then internalizes the processes of her craft. As the musician learns her craft the ability becomes like a ‘second nature’ to her where she ‘knows’ and ‘feels’ what and how she should play.

Much of the data on moral decision-making come from the work of people like Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene who have used fMRI techniques to measure neural activity when subjects process moral dilemmas. The results demonstrate that cognitive and affective responses vary according to the relative personal or impersonal conditions the subject considers. Of course, Van Slyke points out that there are serious limitations on what fMRIs can indicate about ‘moral character’ from isolated thought experiments in a laboratory context. Moreover, virtue theory considers the narrative of a person’s life including how one’s character has been formed prior to any particular moral decision.

In her chapter, ‘Virtue and a Feminist Ethics of Care,’ Ruth Groenhout argues that attempts to categorize an ‘ethic of care’ are problematic since these efforts assume the ‘standard taxonomy’ of ethics. This standard taxonomy divides normative theories among consequentialist, deontological, and virtue based approaches. The key problems with this taxonomy are that it unreasonably emphasizes individual decision-making and is reductionistic with regard to thinking that one aspect of our lives is the one salient aspect of our moral lives. That is, it places undue emphasis on agents, acts, and consequences. The ethics of care, however, as well as Confucian ethics place emphasis on relationships, personal narratives, and the much neglected role of emotion in moral decision-making. The ethics of care and virtue ethics do share a number of similarities in that they highlight the importance of relationships and reject the reason–emotion dichotomy. However, the excessive focus on the ‘agent’
neglects the importance of the relationships that have shaped the agent. This truncated view of normative theory fails to account for the complexities of relationships in virtue ethics, an ethic of care, and Confucian ethics since the standard taxonomy fails to consider issues beyond the consequences, the agent’s motivation, and the isolated act in question.  

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84 We would like to thank Rebecca DeYoung, Audra Jenson, Christian Miller, Randie Timpe, and Thomas Williams for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this introduction. Any remaining problems, of course, are ours, not theirs.
Introduction


Envy and Its Discontents

Timothy Perrine and Kevin Timpe

One of the most potent causes of unhappiness is envy. Envy is, I should say, one of the most universal and deep-seated of human passions. . . . Not only does the envious person wish to inflict misfortune and do so whenever he can with impunity, but he is also himself rendered unhappy by envy.

Bertrand Russell, ‘Envy’

INTRODUCTION

Envy and its effects are discussed by many kinds of scholars, including, for example, philosophers, psychologists, and economists. Due to this fact, envy is treated as a reason for acting, a social force, an emotion, an emotional episode, and a vice—sometimes even in the same work. Envy has also been hypothesized as a ‘primary energizer’ of societal ills and social stagnation. There are thus many different accounts of the nature of envy. And this is to be expected. For the term ‘envy’ is sometimes ambiguous between (at least) an emotion, a reason for action, or a moral failing. But partially due to this terminological fecundity, different scholars provide various moral evaluations of envy, ranging from the claim that it is morally vicious to morally benign or even that it is morally praiseworthy.

Our primary concern here is with a particular usage of envy—envy as a vice. Consequently, we seek to develop an account of the nature of the vice of envy. We thus begin by providing a definition of the vice of envy, which will then allow us to differentiate the vice of envy from other things that go by the same name. With a definition in hand, we then distinguish the vice of envy from

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1 Russell (1930), 82 and 85.  
2 Silver and Sabini (1978), 313.  
3 See, for instance, Silver and Sabini (1978), 314.
other usages of the term ‘envy’ and evaluate these diverging claims regarding the moral status of envy. We end the chapter with a brief discussion of the corrective virtues that help an individual overcome envy.

THE NATURE OF ENVY

Our goal in this section is to develop a definition of the vice of envy. A definition is needed since the term ‘envy’ is used in a plethora of ways, which at times leads to scholars talking past one another. We begin by noting some of the myriad ways in which scholars understand envy and its moral status. Some treat envy primarily as an emotion. Marguerite La Caze is one such scholar; she writes that ‘envy is a complex of feelings involving the recognition that others have, through luck or either deserved or undeserved means, received goods or had successes which are considered desirable…’

Envy, in this sense, may indicate proper moral concern, as it can be (along with resentment) a ‘moral emotion’ connected with a concern for justice which has ‘an important role to play both as part of a rich emotional life, and in making it possible to live ethically because they enable us to recognize and respond to injustices against ourselves and others and so relate to other human beings.’

Discussion of envy as an emotion can also be found in other disciplines. There are, for example, a number of illuminating psychological studies of the emotion of envy. Peter Salovey’s oft-cited The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy shows the number of ways in which envy as an emotion is ‘influenced by societal norms and values. It appears to exist in all cultures…’, although the expression of envy may vary somewhat depending on [the] culture.

In his thorough cultural study of envy, psychologist Helmut Schoeck famously argues that the emotion of ‘envy alone makes any kind of social co-existence possible’ by providing a comparison-based motivation for success and further

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4 A more detailed treatment of some these issues can be found in Perrine (2011), from which the present section is adapted with modification.
5 La Caze (2001), 32. La Caze also admits that there is another sense of envy which is an attitude or character trait which disposes a person to feel disturbed at the good fortunes of others. La Caze calls this ‘vicious or unfair envy.’ She grants that this sense of envy is a vice and is thereby ‘likely to detract from one’s own happiness and that of others. Envy in such a case is clearly wrong’ (La Caze 2001, 35). But see Stan Van Hooft (2002) for an argument that La Caze improperly dissociates the emotion she refers to as envy from the deeper character traits that give rise to it.
Envy and Its Discontents

work. ‘Envy is a drive which lies at the core of man’s life as a social being, and which occurs as soon as two individuals become capable of mutual comparison.” According to Schoeck, the emotion of envy plays a central motivational role, one which often in turn motivates a concern for justice:

A certain predisposition to envy is part of man’s physical and social equipment, the lack of which would, in many situations, simply result in his being trampled down by others. . . . Potential envy is an essential part of man’s equipment if he is to be able to test the justice and fairness of the solutions to the problems which occur in his life.10

Aaron Ben-Ze’ev similarly remarks that ‘some degree of jealousy and envy is essential in preventing attitudes of total indifference between people. In fact, quite often deliberate attempts are made to induce jealousy in mates, or envy in friends.’11 Envy’s role in social motivation and cohesion in this respect has also been documented in apes12 and canines.13

Others primarily treat envy, not as an emotion, but as a disposition. According to Rawls, for example, envy is ‘the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others even though their being more fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantages.’14 Rawls distinguishes between ‘benign envy,’ where there is ‘no ill will intended or expressed,’ ‘emulative envy,’ which ‘leads us to try to achieve what others have,’ and finally ‘envy proper’ which is a ‘form of rancor that tends to harm both its object and its subject.’15 Gabriele Taylor, in her careful treatment of envy, similarly distinguishes between what she calls ‘state-envy’—when ‘another is merely the occasion for realizing [one’s own] shortcomings’—and ‘object-envy’—when ‘the person concerned focuses on the other as somehow crucially involved in her finding herself in an inferior position.’16

Our specific interest, however, is with envy as a capital vice. Having an adequate definition of the capital vice of envy will allow us to distinguish between the various different states that these authors call ‘envy.’ To this end, we begin with an examination of Thomas Aquinas’ analysis of envy, since he offers one of the best treatments of the definition of envy in the literature. One of the virtues of Aquinas’ analysis is his attempt to distinguish envy from similar sorts of acts. To accomplish this, he offers a definition of envy as ‘sorrow for another’s good . . . [when] another’s good may be reckoned as being one’s own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another’s good.’17 Yet, despite the strengths of his account, Aquinas fails to provide an

17 ST II-II.36.1. Aquinas also discusses envy in De Malo, question 10. Because these two discussions are very similar, we focus on the account in the ST.
adequate definition of envy. For his definition fails to include all cases of envy and fails to provide the common element to all instances of envy.

Aquinas’ Account of Envy

In the *Summa*, Aquinas treats envy as a vice opposed to charity. Envy is opposed to charity because it is opposed to an effect of charity—rejoicing over another’s good. As Anthony Kenny has pointed out, envy is always directed at another person. For Aquinas, charity involves loving one’s neighbor and wishing what is good for her. In contrast with charity, envy does not rejoice over another’s good, but is adverse to it. Aquinas calls this aversion ‘sorrowing over another’s good’ and considers envy to be a kind of sorrowing over another’s good.

But Aquinas notes that there are many different ways to sorrow over another’s good, and not all of these ways are envy properly speaking. Aquinas discusses three specific cases: fear, zeal, and righteous indignation. A person can sorrow over another’s good ‘through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or to some other goods.’ For example, a citizen of a city may sorrow over the ability of an invading commander to command and deploy his troops effectively, for the citizen is fearful that the commander’s abilities might bring about the destruction of his own well-being. This sorrowing, however, is clearly not envy but fear, since the aversion to another’s good is caused by seeing that good as harmful to oneself. Second, one may grieve over another’s good ‘not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not.’ For example, upon noticing the great piety of her friend Cathy, Christine desires to become more pious—all the while, not being adverse to Cathy’s piety. Aquinas claims that this form of sorrow over another’s good is not envy either, but zeal, and fails to be vicious. Here, one does not become adverse to the other’s good, but desires one’s own good all the more. (Let us note that, while we agree with Aquinas that zeal is distinct

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18 *ST* II-II.36.
19 See Kenny (1963), 193: ‘It is possible to be envious of one’s own fruit trees; but only if one mistakenly believes that the land on which they stand is part of one’s neighbor’s property. . . . What is not possible is to envy something which one believes to belong to oneself.’
20 *ST* II-II.25.1. See Roberts (2007), 72. Aquinas also extends charity to include love of one’s self; see *ST* II-II.25.4.
21 *ST* II-II.36.1.
22 Here, as throughout, we ignore instances of acts which are simultaneously an act of envy and something which is not envy, e.g. fear. Such acts are clearly possible; but for the present purposes of defining envy we focus on pure cases of envy.
23 *ST* II-II.36.2.
24 *ST* II-II.36.2.
25 *ST* II-II.36.2.
26 Many authors speak of an envy that leads one to emulate another; traditionally, this form of ‘envy’ was called zeal or emulation. See, for example, Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II.11 (1388a30–5).
from envy, and fails to be vicious, we are dubious of his claim that zeal is a form of sorrow over another’s good. We are inclined to think that zeal is better categorized as sorrow over one’s own lack of a good, perhaps occasioned by seeing another’s good.) Third, one may sorrow over another’s good because that person is undeserving of that good. For Aquinas, this is not envy properly speaking either, but a form of indignation, which Aquinas claims can belong to ‘good morals.’ According to Aquinas, these three different ways one can sorrow over another’s good—fear, zeal, and indignation—are not cases of envy, but states distinct from envy. Consequently, he endeavors to provide a definition of envy that excludes them as cases of envy. However, Aquinas actually offers two definitions of envy, in two separate passages.

In ST, IIaIIae 36.1, Aquinas states that ‘envy is about another’s good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have.’ Aquinas’ first definition of envy is thus: sorrow over another’s good in so far as that good diminishes one’s own good name. This definition connects envy with the vice of vainglory, the immoderate desire for glory. Glory is the display of some (perceived) excellence—a ‘manifestation of someone’s goodness.’ When a person desires glory for something other than an appropriate end, that person has an immoderate desire for glory. This definition of envy connects envy and vainglory by making the object of the latter—glory—an essential part of the definition of the former. Here a person envies when another person’s excellence keeps people from acknowledging her own excellence. The other’s ‘good name’ lessens her own ‘good name.’

But Aquinas provides a second definition of envy in the very next question: ‘we grieve over a man’s good in so far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking and is always sinful.’ This second definition of envy is thus sorrow over another’s good when one is sorrowful because the other’s good surpasses one’s own, that is, when another is more excellent. Whereas the first definition connected envy to vainglory, this one connects envy to pride. For Aquinas, a person is proud when she has an inordinate desire of her own excellence; he writes, ‘for to be proud is nothing else but to exceed the proper measure in the desire for excellence.’ In these cases of envy, a person desires to hold a higher position than she actually holds; holding this higher position is meant to be a rival to the person to which she compares herself. What is noteworthy about this second definition of envy is its divergence from the first. The first incorporates one’s ‘good name’ into the definition of envy; the second

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27 *ST* II-II.36.2.  
28 *ST* II-II.36.2.  
29 *ST* II-II.132.2.  
30 *De Malo* 9.1; cf. *ST* II-II.132.1.  
31 *ST* II-II.132.1–2.  
32 *ST* II-II.36.2. The ‘properly speaking’ suggests that Aquinas is offering a definition here.  
33 *ST* II-II.162.1.ad 2, II-II.162.2.  
34 *De Malo* 8.2.
incorporates one’s ‘excellence.’ But clearly one’s good name and one’s excellence need not be the same thing—one can have a good name, but lack an excellence, or conversely one can have an excellence, but lack a good name.

So, Aquinas offers us two different definitions that are not coextensive. Unfortunately, neither is adequate insofar as a good definition should do at least two things. First, it should include all cases of envy and exclude all cases that are not cases of envy. It should be ‘broad’ enough to include all the various ways in which one can envy, but ‘narrow’ enough to include only them. Second, a good definition should provide that which is common to all cases of envy. A definition that did these two things would provide, in Aquinas’ terms, the ‘formal cause’ of envy. Both of Aquinas’ definitions fail to meet these requirements of an adequate definition. Note, first, that each is too narrow. Each incorporates into the definition of envy a particular kind of envy—the first, a kind of envy associated with vainglory, the second, a kind associated with pride. Consequently, some cases of the first type of envy will fail to be cases of envy according to the second definition; similarly, some cases of the second type of envy will fail to be cases of envy according to the first definition. Thus, neither definition can cover all cases of envy.

One might attempt to mend Aquinas’ definition by making his definition disjunctive. Indeed, such a disjunctive definition may be closer to Aquinas’ original thought; at one point he writes that ‘another’s good may be reckoned as being one’s own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another’s good: and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed. Perhaps Aquinas intends to define envy disjunctively by stating that acts of envy are either of the first type of envy or of the second type of envy. Now such a disjunctive definition will include all cases of envy only if there are only two types of envy—those connected to pride and vainglory. But if there is a third type of envy, then this definition will also be inadequate. Are there simply two types of envy? It is implausible to think so. Often people are envious, not of other’s good name or excellence, but of other’s relationships. A classic case is the biblical case of Joseph and his brothers. The brothers were envious of the love their father had for Joseph. His father’s love was not an excellence or good name of Joseph’s. So they were envious of something other than a good name or excellence. But if one can envy another’s love, then it is

35 This second requirement is important because it excludes definitions of things that simply list all the things that fall under the relevant term.
36 ST II-II.36.1, emphasis ours.
37 Let us note that it is expositionally unclear if Aquinas is actually offering a disjunctive definition.
38 This example was suggested by Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung.
plausible that one can envy other things as well, such a material possessions. So it is implausible that there are only two kinds of envy.

**Perceptions of Inferiority and Envy**

In the remainder of this section, we argue that an adequate definition of envy requires the notion of a perception of inferiority. Since perceptions of inferiority are the result of a comparative notion of self-worth, we begin by explaining the latter. Although the connection between envy and comparative self-worth has been noted before, its role in helping provide a definition of envy—and thereby distinguishing it from other ways of sorrowing—has not. We will thus first describe a comparative notion of self-worth before turning to how it can amend Aquinas’ definition of envy.

What distinguishes envy from other types of sorrowing is that envy originates with a comparative notion of self-worth. Comparative self-worth is a way of evaluating one’s own worth by comparing oneself to others. In order to have this sort of self-worth, one must compare oneself to others. Comparison is essentially a two-term relation—it requires another thing, with which to be compared. Consequently, given a comparative notion of self-worth, one cannot ask the question of worth in isolation; it must be asked when there are others to be measured against.

Here a counterfactual test is useful. Namely: if a person were to come to believe that she were surpassed by another, would her self-worth diminish? If so, then that person has a comparative notion of self-worth. If not, then that person most likely does not. This counterfactual test is useful, for one can have a positive estimation of oneself while having a comparative notion of self-worth. For example, a person utilizing a comparative notion of self-worth may still evaluate herself positively if she does not believe anyone else surpasses her.

A comparative notion of self-worth can give rise to a perception of inferiority in which one conceives of oneself as inferior to another. A perception of inferiority requires four things. It requires (i) an evaluation of another’s good, (ii) an evaluation of one’s own good, and (iii) a comparison between the two evaluations in which (iv) due to a comparative notion of self-worth one perceive one’s worth to be inferior as a result of the comparison.

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39 One’s self-worth is distinct from one’s worth as a self; rather, one’s self-worth is similar to one’s self-esteem.
40 The ‘others’ here need not be actual different individuals. Rather it could even be conceptions of people, e.g. fictitious characters.
41 This account of envy enjoys some empirical verification. Psychologists Peter Salovey and Judith Rodin performed a study on what they called ‘social-comparison jealousy,’ which can be taken to be roughly synonymous with our usage of the vice of envy. They found that envy was most intensely experienced when a subject was in ‘situations (a) containing negative feedback
qualification ‘due to a comparative notion of self-worth’ is important here. For there can be many sorts of judgments of inferiority, and not all of these are relevant to envy. For instance, I may judge myself to be inferior to certain Olympic athletes with regard to (say) rowing; but such a judgment of inferiority is irrelevant to my own self-worth. I may also judge myself to be inferior to some person by an independent standard. Both kinds of judgments of inferiority are to be kept distinct from the perception of inferiority that occurs in cases of envy. In perceptions of inferiority of the sort relevant to envy, one perceives one’s worth to be inferior only if one feels as if one’s own self-worth is now diminished due to the other person’s good. One takes the other’s superiority to indicate a lack of value in oneself. To put the point differently, others may be able to tell that you are inferior to another in those other regards; but only you can feel your own worth to be inferior.

As noted earlier, the role of comparative self-worth in envy has not been unnoticed. For example, in his article ‘Envy and Inequality,’ Aaron Ben-Ze’ev writes that

the natural candidate for [the central concern of envy] is inferiority. The importance of the inferiority concern in envy conveys the weight we attach to our comparative stand. People compare themselves with others to reduce uncertainty about themselves and maintain or enhance self-esteem. An unfavorable comparison often leads to envy.  

Similarly, Gabriele Taylor writes that ‘envy rests on interpersonal comparison. The envious person thinks of another as being in some way better off than she is herself.’ And Rebecca DeYoung, in her book Glittering Vices, notes the important role that a comparative notion of self-worth plays in the vice of envy.

What does seem to be unnoticed to date, however, is how this notion of comparative self-worth can amend the lack in Aquinas’ definition of envy. What distinguishes cases of envy from other kinds of sorrowing are perceptions of inferiority. When a person perceives that she is inferior to another and that perception gives rise to sorrowing over the other’s good, then that person is envious. Thus, we may define envy as: sorrow over another’s good because of a perception of inferiority regarding the other’s good. This definition is clearly in the same vein of thought as Aquinas’. In fact, we can see it best as amending and supplementing his account, not replacing it.

Note that an envious person sorrows over another’s good, not simply when that person’s good actually surpasses the envier’s good, but because the envious

about oneself (b) in a domain that is particularly self-defining, (c) followed by a comparison to another person who has performed well on this same self-defining dimension rather than on another dimension’ (Salovey and Rodin 1984, 782).

44 DeYoung (2009), 41–57, especially 44–9.
person perceives the other’s good to surpass his own (even when it may not). The exact relationship between a perception of inferiority and sorrowing is complex. Nevertheless, it seems there is at the very least some sort of causal connection between one’s perception and one’s sorrow. One’s sorrow follows from one’s perception of inferiority; if one lacked a perception of inferiority, then one would not envy. And one would lack a perception of inferiority only if one did not have a comparative notion of self-worth.

Envy involves the disposition to feel hostility, spite, or ill-will at the perceived superiority of another person in some respect, be it possessions, success, or reputation. And here we see that

a further self-referring attitude lying at a deeper level within envy is a form of dissatisfaction with oneself. When one feels envy, one is dissatisfied with one’s own possessions and situation. One might go on envying the corrupt politician for example, not only because he has something which I want, but also because I am not satisfied with my own situation and want to be in his. This is demonstrated when, if I do get what he has, I might still envy him because he got it before I did. Because I am fundamentally dissatisfied with myself, my envy is not relieved when I do get what I want.45

So envy is being disposed to will against the good of the other—the envious person ‘would like to see the other person robbed, dispossessed, stripped, humiliated or hurt’46—but it also involves being disposed to feel contrary to one’s own (true, even if unperceived) good. It thus detracts from the common good in two ways. (It can also count against the common good in further ways as it can easily lead to other related vices, such as malice, cruelty, vindictiveness, and schadenfreude.) So it should be ‘obvious by now how the fundamental attitude of the envious is directly opposed to love. To love is to seek others’ good and rejoice when they have it. To envy is to seek to destroy others’ good and sorrow over their having it.’47

Differentiating ‘Envy’

This definition allows us differentiate between the various things that go under the name ‘envy.’ First, this definition allows us to distinguish envy proper from indignation. We take La Caze to be describing indignation when she writes ‘some forms of envy are not only excusable, but morally valuable: those forms which are directed at undeserved success and beneficiaries of unjust circumstances.’48 In the case of indignation, one sorrows over another’s good because that person is undeserving of that good. What gives rise to the sorrow is not a

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45 Van Hooft (2002), 144.
47 DeYoung (2009), 51.
48 La Caze (2001), 32.
perception of inferiority but rather something more akin to a sense of justice. Consequently, this definition of envy will exclude cases of indignation from the class of envy.

Further, this definition excludes cases of zeal as cases of envy. At first, it may appear that, on this definition, cases of zeal count as envy. Our definition of envy is sorrow over another’s good because of a perception of inferiority regarding another’s good. Is not this just what happens in a case of zeal? Recall the example of Christine and Cathy. Christine sees Cathy’s piety. Christine notices her own piety, and then sees that Cathy’s surpasses her own. Christine, desiring to be as pious as possible, sorrows over not achieving a certain level of piety. Is this not a case of sorrowing over another’s good because of a perception of inferiority regarding another’s good?

In response, note two things. First, as we said above, we disagree with Aquinas that zeal is a form of sorrow over another’s good. Since envy is a form of sorrow over another’s good, our account implies that zeal is distinct from envy. Second, cases of zeal lack perceptions of inferiority. As mentioned above, perceptions of inferiority require four things: (i) an evaluation of another’s good, (ii) an evaluation of one’s own good, and (iii) a comparison between the two evaluations in which (iv) due to a comparative notion of self-worth, one perceives one’s worth to be inferior as a result of the comparison. Cases of zeal lack perceptions of inferiority because to have a perception of inferiority one must have a comparative notion of self-worth, and the zealous fail to have this qua zealous. When a zealous person judges herself to be inferior to another, she implicitly makes appeal to a standard that is independent of herself and the person she is judging to be superior to her. The zealous person recognizes, by her comparison with another, that one can do better along this independent standard then she currently is. But the zealous person does not evaluate her self-worth in terms of comparison with the other. So the zealous person lacks a perception of inferiority; zeal is not an instance of envy.49

Finally, this definition allows us to distinguish envy from jealousy. Although—informally—the terms are often used interchangeably, there are important differences between the two. Most importantly, in cases of envy, the envier lacks some good that another has; in cases of jealousy, the jealous has the good and is fearful that the good might be lost to another. As Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung writes, ‘although we often use jealousy and envy synonymously, jealousy is the condition of loving something and

49 Thus, consider a zealous person whose self-worth is intimately tied up with being as pious as possible. If this person has convinced herself that she is as pious as possible but then meets another who is more pious, that zealous person may actually feel her self-worth diminish. But this will not be a case of envy. For the zealous person may feel her self-worth diminish, not because another is comparatively better, but because she has fallen short of her self-imposed standard for positive evaluation of her self-worth. Thanks to Christian Van Dyke and David McNaughton for urging more clarity on these points.
possessing it, and then feeling threatened because the loved thing or person might be taken away.\textsuperscript{50}

Cases of jealousy need not involve perceptions of inferiority. In particular, they fail the fourth condition: one perceives one's worth to be inferior. For in cases of jealousy, it is not that the other person surpasses one's own worth—the other person lacks the relevant good! Further, a case of jealousy might not even involve a comparative notion of self-worth. A person might fear the loss of some good not because it makes her comparatively better off, but because she enjoys that good in and of itself.

Other features differentiate envy from jealousy. Robert Solomon says that jealousy has a feature that envy lacks: ‘as opposed to envy, jealousy requires some sort of legitimate claim. A jealous person must have some right (or believe that he does) to the thing in question.'\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, it is commonly understood that envy involves an element of willing against the good of another that need not be part of jealousy. To quote Solomon again: ‘envy is not just covetous but involves a malevolent attitude toward the envied person. I am not sure whether this is a necessary ingredient in envy, but it is certainly a common one. Thus envy’s double edge: It is not just competitive without hope or merit and so damaging to oneself. It can also be malicious and dangerous to the other person as well, or . . . damaging to the general social system in which it plays a role.'\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{ENVY’S OFFSPRING}

The above account also explains envy’s role as a capital vice. A capital vice is one which gives rise to other vices and directs them to a particular goal or end.\textsuperscript{53} On this account, envy is the result of a perception of inferiority. Because an envious person is experiencing unpleasant emotions and feelings regarding her own self-worth, she will attempt to remove that perception of inferiority, so that she no longer judges the envied person to be superior to herself. By doing so, the envious person will no longer be envious and return a measure of self-worth to herself.\textsuperscript{54} There are two ways to reclaim this position. One is to reduce or remove the superiority of the other in some way, so that the envied individual is at least on a par with the envier. The other is for the envier to increase her position so that she surpasses that of the envied. Since the former

\textsuperscript{50} DeYoung (2009), 44. \textsuperscript{51} Solomon (2007), 105.
\textsuperscript{52} Solomon (2007), 105. \textsuperscript{53} ST I-IIa.84.3 and 4.
\textsuperscript{54} We here discuss some of the ways people attempt to maintain self-worth. For a much more comprehensive list, see Crocker and Park (2003), specifically 299–304.
is often times easier to achieve, the envious are more likely to pursue it over the latter.\textsuperscript{55}

If the envier is envious of the public standing or good name of another, then the envier may attempt to reduce that good name. For example, he may publicly detract from the importance or impressiveness of the other’s accomplishment (the vice of detraction or slander). Alternatively, the envier may not publicly detract another, but secretly go about spreading rumors regarding the other or his accomplishments (the vice of tale bearing or gossip). Regarding \textit{how} the envier attempts to reduce the good name of another, there are two chief ways. First, the envier can diminish the actual importance or impressiveness of the other’s accomplishments that are the objects of comparison for the envier (‘Sure, if headquarters gave me \textit{those} many resources, I could have easily secured that contract!’); second, the envier can draw attention to other (real or imaginary) faults of the envied (‘Anyone who spent that much time at the office could accomplish that, but I prefer to not neglect my children’s well-being.’).\textsuperscript{56} The ultimate goal of these actions is to lessen the good name of the other, so that the envious person’s comparative position is increased.

Envy can also give rise to \textit{schadenfreude} and hate. \textit{Schadenfreude} is finding pleasure in the pain of another. Envy can give rise to \textit{schadenfreude} when the person who is the object of envy undergoes some particular pain or loss. In particular, if the envied undergoes something bad that is directly relevant to the quality that surpasses that of those envying. For example, suppose a group of students is envious of another student, who does not work hard, but nevertheless excels in schoolwork. If that group of students comes to learn that that student was caught cheating and punished, they are more likely to experience \textit{schadenfreude} than if they learn that some other ill befell the student (e.g. her bike was stolen).\textsuperscript{57} Hate is when a person wishes ill of another and does not take pleasure in their good. For the envier, the goods of another are not a source of pleasure, but pain, since they are what give rise to a perception of inferiority. Further, because the goods of another give rise to perceptions of inferiority, the envier will find pleasure in the loss, removal, or hampering of those goods. Further,

\textsuperscript{55} Stan Van Hooft writes that ‘Envy is a specific form of being displeased: namely one motivated by greed and self-dissatisfaction’ (2002), 145. Van Hooft seems mistaken in including greed in this way. For an envious person, more likely than not, will desire that a person lack the relevant good than that he or she actually has it. (If I have the nicest car in the neighborhood, and then my neighbor buys a nicer one, I would be just as content with his car being stolen as with coming to own \textit{that} make and model.) This indicates that, while greed may be part of some instances of envy, it is only accidentally so.

\textsuperscript{56} These two ways roughly correspond to what Alicke and Zell call ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ control in their (2008), 86f.

\textsuperscript{57} Cf. Powell, Smith, and Schutz (2008).
the envier will wish ill of another in that she desires that the other lose his comparative superiority. But hate of another can extend beyond the relevant area of goods. For example, suppose that Alex is envious of James’ abilities as a basketball player. As a result of envy, Alex may come to hate James. But he might not simply wish ill of James’ basketball ability; he may also wish ill regarding other things in James’ life that have little to nothing to do with basketball ability.  

Envy can also lead to other vices—such as vainglory, covetousness, greed, and injustice—though we do not have the space to discuss these in the present chapter. But when they do arise, these ‘daughter vices’, like schadenfreude and hate, show that the envious is concerned to remove the sense of inferiority they have when compared to another.

ENVY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

So far, we have specified the nature of envy as being sorrow over another’s good because of a perception of one’s own inferiority regarding the other’s good, and documented its relationship to other vices. We can now return to the treatment of envy in the social sciences with which the paper began, for the definition we’ve developed helps differentiate the vice of envy from the motivational force that gets labeled the same in the social-scientific literature. Such a differentiation is needed in order to see how some of what social scientists find to be morally neutral or even praiseworthy about ‘envy’ really can be; these cases, we argue, are not about the vice of envy at all. Our definition will also help show how those cases involving damage to one’s own good or the good of the community really can be about the vice of envy.

Susan Fiske is an example of a psychologist who is aware of the difference between envy as a vice and envy as a motivating emotion; she differentiates ‘benign envy’ (what we’ve been calling envy as a motivating emotion) from ‘malicious envy,’ the vice. Yet her work also shows ways in which benign envy can lead to malicious envy. As Fiske puts it, ‘we [humans] are comparison machines.’ Numerous studies show that we’re more likely to compare ourselves with other individuals who are similar to ourselves than with those who are more distant on some scale. But the research also shows that we tend to make comparisons upward rather than downward; that is, we are more likely to compare ourselves with those who possess more of a particular good that we have than with those who possess less of it. Benign envy motivates us precisely because of the comparison we make between our own possession of

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59 Fiske (2010), 703f.
the good in question and the other’s possession of the same good. But when we are frustrated from achieving the good that we want, the same psychological mechanisms that had earlier motivated us could now lead us to wish for the person we are comparing our self with to lose her good. So it is not surprising that people who self-report feeling higher levels of envy towards those who have a higher socio-economic status also report a greater tendency towards harming them, especially when coupled with anger.\(^{61}\) And other research suggests that upward comparisons are more likely when an individual is feeling unhappy or insecure, precisely when the inferiority that encourages benign envy to develop into the vice of envy is itself increased.\(^{62}\)

Perhaps the most research has been done on envy of wealth and other material goods. Although their understanding of happiness is not the same as is usually embraced by virtue-based approaches to ethics—usually focusing on ‘subjective well-being’ rather than \textit{eudemonia}—numerous studies show that, beyond a certain level of affluence, increased wealth does not correlate with increased happiness.\(^{63}\) What matters significantly more than real wealth, according to the work of both psychologists and economists, is positional wealth\(^ {64}\) and the acquisition of positional goods—goods which are valued, in large part, due to their scarcity alone.\(^ {65}\) The more affluent a society becomes, the more that both demand and consumption are driven by competition for positional goods, which in turn heightens the competitive thinking that drives envy. But it’s also the case that merely living in an increasingly affluent society increases the cost of achieving one’s own ends, even if it doesn’t drive up one’s own desires for wealth.

A plethora of books document this rise in the wealth of those in developed countries, and their impact on their citizens. Robert Frank’s \textit{Luxury Fever}, for example, documents the dramatic increase in material prosperity in the United States.\(^ {66}\) Two of these increases are as follows, though there are many more: the average size of a newly built house doubled between the 1950s and the late 1990s, and the average price of purchased automobiles increased by seventy-five per cent in the 1990s.\(^ {67}\) The increasing disparity of wealth, even if

\(^{61}\) Fiske (2011), 23f. \(^ {62}\) See, for example, Lyumbomirsky and Ross (1997).

\(^{63}\) See, for a few examples among many, Frank (1999), particularly chapter 5 and Schwartz (2004), particularly chapter 5.

\(^{64}\) Hirsch refers to positional wealth as oligarchic wealth; see Hirsch (1976), 27.

\(^{65}\) In a meta-analysis of 207 studies totaling over 142,000 respondents, researchers noted that ‘when people reported how they actually felt about the difference between “us” and “them” or indicated that their relative disadvantage was undeserved or unfair, it was these feelings—not the sheer [actual] difference—that predicted collective action’ (Fiske 2011, 89). See, among numerous others, Hirsch (1976), 2ff; Klein (1997); Solnick and Hemenway (1998); and Schwartz (2004), chapter 9 and 152ff.

\(^{66}\) This increase is, of course, not restricted to the United States. As Robert Frank points out, ‘Japan, with fewer than half as many people as the United States, consumes more than half the U.S. volume of luxury goods’ (Frank 1999, 32).

\(^{67}\) Frank (1999), 3, 4, and 21.
the worst off were increasing in real wealth, impacts all the members of society. Given what we know from psychology about upwards comparative judgments, the super-rich set the bar for relative comparison in a way that trickles down through all socio-economic classes. As Robert Frank points out, 'Adam Smith’s celebrated invisible hand ... rests on the assumption that each person’s choices have no negative consequences for others.' But this is not the case in terms of our comparative judgments and beliefs about self-worth. Our psychological mechanisms are such that the success of others leads quite naturally to a decline in our own self-assessment, which leads to envy. The reason for this is tied with the issues of positional goods and relative wealth mentioned above. It is primarily positional goods then which drive the kinds of upwards comparisons which can lead to envy—both as a motivation to work towards those goods one’s self, but also as fertile grounds for the vice. It’s not surprising, therefore, that there is data which suggests that those suffering the vice of envy have lower levels of physical and mental health.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING PRUDENT

We are now in a position to see how, with respect to envy, prudence is needed at a number of junctions. First, prudence can allow us, as moral agents, to differentiate the vice of envy from different kinds of sorrowing over others’ goods that need not be vicious. This important role played by prudence is not, of course, limited simply to envy; it will play a similar role in differentiating, for example, anger from wrath or the vice of pride from pride as proper self-evaluation. Second, since prudence directs the virtues, such as justice and kindness, toward their proper ends as well, and since the end of all the moral virtues is the flourishing of the individual, prudence will thereby also help to integrate the virtues. This is what Keenan calls the integrative function of prudence:

The virtues are interconnected through prudence.... The lack of prudence not only means that an inclination does not become a virtue, but also that, left without this directive and integrating virtue, the agent moves toward disintegration.... The ability to reason well depends in part upon the extent to which the agent’s personality is rightly ordered. Conversely, the ability to develop

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68 It is not the case that the worst-off are increasing in real wealth, however: ‘earnings of those in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution have actually declined by more than 10 percent [between 1979 and 1999]’ (Frank 1999, 45). See also Levy (2007).

69 Frank (1999), 9.

70 Fiske (2011), particularly chapter 2. See also Frank (1999), 142ff.

71 We borrow the ‘directing’ role of prudence from Keenan’s wonderful discussion in his (2002).
a well-ordered personality depends not only upon the intended exercise of well-ordered actions, but also on the prudential determination of those intended exercises. In fact, the function of prudence or right moral reasoning is to determine, intend, and choose actions that will lead to the right realization of those appetites. . . . Prudence functions to perfect a person’s natural inclinations through integrating them into a coordinated way of acting and living in a right manner.\textsuperscript{72}

Prudence involves having, inter alia, the wisdom to see how the individual’s good is interconnected with the good of the larger community of which she is a part. Imprudence can lead one to think that one’s good always comes at the expense of others’ good, and vice versa—a sentiment frequently found in those who envy, and which results not only in individual but also corporate disintegration.

Failing to see that the other’s good doesn’t necessarily count against one’s own good not only contributes to envy, but this envy can lead to a further vice, namely a species of pride:

Invidious, competitive pride is most likely to manifest itself in relationships in which the two individuals are close enough to equality in worldly terms to feel themselves competitors, and yet not very close friends or lovers. . . . It is not difficult to see why people who lack humility are spiritually bankrupt. Their capacity for human relationships—the spiritual ones that are the most important of their lives—is poisoned by the tendency to climb to eminence at someone else’s expense. The proud person is one who feels good about himself only if he has somebody who compares disadvantageously with himself.\textsuperscript{73}

In contrast, the truly prudent individual will properly understand how individuals’ goods can be cooperative and mutually reinforcing rather than necessarily competitive. Prudence’s twin functions of perfecting practical reasoning and directing the individual’s inclinations to their virtuous realization are part of the overarching role prudence plays in directing the individual’s entire life in virtue.

Finally, if there are uses of the term ‘envy’ that actually refer to good objects—as La Caze, Schoeck, and others suggest—then prudence will also help us understand and achieve these goals. As with all moral goods, the attainment of prudence will make it easier to develop further virtues. ‘This requirement makes [the] interplay between prudence and the moral virtues dynamic. For although the moral virtues need prudence to set the mean to realize the ends of the moral virtues, prudence needs those moral virtues disposed to their ends in order for prudence and those virtues to advance.’\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Keenan (2002), 265, 267, and 259.  
\textsuperscript{73} Roberts (2007), 85–6.  
\textsuperscript{74} Keenan (2002), 261.
We end on a more optimistic note. The vice of envy is contrasted with corrective virtues—virtues that reduce and eliminate the vice, combat the vice’s offspring vices, and generally restore the well-being to an individual. With envy, two virtues in particular stand out as corrective: charity and humility.

One reason why envy is so powerful is because the ultimate desire it aims to satisfy is so powerful, namely having a positive estimation of one’s own self-worth. It is deeply important to us human persons that we see our own lives, what we do, and who we are, as valuable and worthwhile. As we’ve seen, the envious person may try many ways to minimize envy, some of which are vicious in their own right, in an attempt to find a positive evaluation of himself. What is important to notice, however, is how woefully inadequate these ways are as a response to the vice of envy. For they do not remove the vice; they simply attempt to work around it, and with it, to minimize its harmful effects (and even then these strategies are bound to have mixed results). Put simply, these ways do not correct envy, but merely mask it. Further, these ways fail to provide what is ultimately desired by the envious person—a positive evaluation of their own self-worth. Even if one achieves some measure of comparative success, such a position is an unstable foundation for self-worth. For there are still those who came before, who perhaps achieve that relevant good faster, with more success, etc. . . . And there are still those who come after, who can dethrone.

Charity and humility are correcting virtues, not because they work around envy, but because they remove the source and results of envy. As noted earlier, envy is opposed to charity, which is the virtue to love another and tend towards that which is good for her. Whereas charity requires wishing others well, expressing joy when good things happen to them, loving them, and loving one’s self, envy leads to wishing ill of others, expressing sorrow over their good, and ultimately hating them. The development of charity will naturally drive out envy, since one cannot both rejoice and sorrow over another’s particular good. Charity will naturally manifest itself in ways that discourage envy. Earlier we approvingly quoted Van Hooft as saying that ‘a further self-referring attitude lying at a deeper level within envy is a form of dissatisfaction with oneself. When one feels envy, one is dissatisfied with one’s own possessions and situation.’ Such dissatisfaction may arise from a lack of self-love, which shows that envy may partially be the result of a lack of love.

75 Consider an analogy: a person with a cavity may simply stop eating foods that irritate the cavity. This does not ‘correct’ the cavity. It does not remove the aliment; it simply attempts to work around it. To correct it, the person must treat the cavity directly.

76 For more on charity, see Paul Wadell’s chapter in this volume.

77 See again the study by Lyumbomirsky and Ross (1997).
for one's own person. This is why charity is a corrective virtue to envy, for charity requires self-love. Beyond this, charity also helps one see that one's own good and the good of the other are not necessarily competitive or exclusive. As evidenced by some of the work by social-psychologists, when we see our own good as connected with the good of others, rather than as competing with the good of others, we are less likely to suffer the vice of envy. Particularly if one takes a view such as Aquinas’ in which all creatures’ ultimate good is found in union with God, charity will unify rather than divide individuals. Even Bertrand Russell saw that envy could be overcome by seeing the good of the other as cooperative rather than competitive: ‘merely to realize the causes of one’s own envious feelings is to take a long step towards curing them. The habit of thinking in terms of comparison is a fatal one.’ Replacing such comparisons with admiration both diminishes envy and increases happiness.

The other virtue that corrects envy is humility. Humility is frequently understood to be a negative character trait such that the humble person is one who underestimates her own self-worth and is inappropriately deferent to others. This is not what we mean by the virtue of humility. We understand humility to be the disposition to recognize that each person has an innate, non-contingent worth or value, including one’s own self. As we’ve argued, envy arises from a comparative notion of self-worth, where in order for a person to feel positive about his own self-worth he must positively compare with another. A humble person, however, will not see her own self-worth depend upon a positive comparison to another. She will instead find her self-worth rooted in something else. This is not to say that the humble person will never compare herself with others—according to some studies, the disposition to compare is overwhelming and constant. Rather, it is to say that those comparisons will not offer her fodder for evaluating her self-worth, as in the vice of envy, but will rather offer occasions for self-improvement, as in the motivational emotion which goes by the same name.

WORKS CITED


78 See Fiske (2011), 111–18. 79 Russell (1930), 87. 80 Russell (1930), 85. 81 For more on humility, see Craig Boyd’s chapter on pride in this volume.

82 Authorship on this article is equal. We would like to thank Chris Callaway, Zac Cogley, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, David McNaughton, Christina Van Dyke, and Audra Jenson for helpful comments and discussions related to this paper.
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